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Many mischiefs arise on the change of a maxim and rule of the Common Law, 
which those who altered it could not see when they made the change. [FN1] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been suggested that the whole of the private law may be regarded as the law 
of consent. [FN2] The law of torts is based on the principle that subject to the law of 
the land, no one has the right to interfere with another person's physical and economic 
integrity and freedom without that person's consent. 
This article examines the historical and jurisprudential evolution of the concept of 
consent in the law of trespass to person with an emphasis on issues associated with 
consent to, and refusal of, medical treatment. Consent to treatment and refusal of 
treatment have been regarded merely as obverse *2 sides of the same coin. [FN3] One 
of the premises of this article is that the law is inconsistent insofar as it considers 
consent to be a relative value while regarding refusal as an absolute and inalienable 
right. 
For the purposes of this article, the phrase "life-saving treatment" is used to denote 
medical treatment (antibiotics to treat pneumonia, blood transfusions, certain organ 
transplants, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and the like) administered to cure or 
stabilize a life-threatening but treatable and potentially reversible medical condition, 
usually in an emergency situation. The phrase also applies to medical treatment 
undertaken for the purpose of enhancing the quality of life for those patients who 
suffer from an incurable condition but who are conscious and not hopelessly ill, for 
instance, patients suffering from chronic renal failure, chronic hepatitis, or chronic 
lymphatic leukemia. The phrase "life-sustaining treatment" refers to such medical 
devices as a mechanical ventilator, a catheter, or a feeding tube, which are utilized to 
keep alive patients who are hopelessly ill because their vital functions are seriously 
impaired, but who are not terminally ill as, for example, persons in a coma or in a 
vegetative state. [FN4] 
Medical and legal ramifications of utilizing the legal criterion of "sound mind" as 
it applies to the issue of consent to, and refusal of, life-saving treatment also will be 
broached. It is asserted that when assessing the decisional capacity of a patient to 
refuse life-saving treatment, the traditional notions of "sound mind" should be 
modified to include modern medical understanding of affective competency. [FN5] 
This needs to be done to protect the vulnerable patients whose cognitive capacity may 
be intact, but whose decisional competency is impaired by illness or systemic disease. 
As the title suggests, this article discusses concepts of consent to, and refusal of, 
medical treatment in the context of the tort of trespass. The tort of negligence is 
focused on the defendant. Under the law of negligence, one must guard against 
creating risks that may result in an injury to another when there exists a legal duty of 
care toward that other person. If a particular risk cannot be eliminated or minimized, 
then the risk ought to be disclosed to those who may be harmed by it. In cases of 
negligence relating to the physician-patient relationship, the central question is 
whether or not the *3 defendant medical practitioner has complied with the duty to 
exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of diagnosis, advice, and treatment 
to the patient. The breach of duty may involve a failure to disclose a reasonably 
foreseeable material risk. However, the patient can only sue in negligence for 
nondisclosure of the particular risk if the risk actually eventuates, causing an injury. 
The issue of consent in negligence is thus relevant insofar as it helps to establish 
the standard of care expected of a medical practitioner in relation to provision of 
advice and information. Did the medical practitioner provide enough information to 
enable the patient to choose between undergoing or not undergoing the risky 
treatment in question? [FN6] In the case of Canterbury v. Spence, [FN7] the United 
States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia said that the "patient's right to 
self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal." [FN8] Consequently, the 
interest in bodily integrity commands "protection, not only against an intentional 
invasion by an unauthorized operation but also against a negligent invasion by his 
physician's dereliction of duty to adequately disclose." [FN9] To paraphrase, the right 
to decide what should be done to one's body is protected by the torts of trespass and 
negligence, but in different ways. The tort of trespass protects one's right to decide 
whether or not to consent to an interference. The tort of negligence protects one's right 
to be informed about the factors that will be material to that decision. 
The law of trespass to person--as further explained below--focuses on the patient's 
right to be free of any unwanted bodily contacts and the right to decide whether or not 
such contacts should occur. Therefore, the ultimate issue of the physician's liability in 
trespass to person has to be determined by reference to the presence or absence of 
valid consent. In the case of Reibl v. Hughes [FN10], Chief Justice Laskin of the 
Canadian Supreme Court noted that he could 
appreciate the temptation to say that the genuineness of consent to medical 
treatment depends on proper disclosure of the risks which it entails, but . . . unless 
there has been misrepresentation or fraud to secure consent to the treatment, a failure 
to disclose the attendant risks, however serious, should go to negligence rather than to 
battery. Although such a failure relates to an informed choice of submitting to or 
refusing recommended and appropriate treatment, it arises as the breach of an anterior 
duty of due care, comparable in legal obligation to the duty *4 of due care in carrying 
out the particular treatment to which the patient has consented. It is not a test of the 
validity of the consent. [FN11] 
Likewise, the majority on the High Court of Australia, in the case of Rogers v. 
Whitaker, [FN12] rejected the American doctrine of informed consent in the context 
of the law of negligence. [FN13] The High Court described the phrase "informed 
consent" as "somewhat amorphous," and "apt to mislead as it suggests a test of the 
validity of a patient's consent." [FN14] Furthermore, the High Court commented that 
the expression "the patient's right to self-determination" is "perhaps, suitable to cases 
where the issue is whether a person has agreed to the general surgical procedure or 
treatment, but is of little assistance in the balancing process that is involved in the 
determination of whether there has been a breach of the duty of disclosure." [FN15] 
Legal authorities in the United States, Australia, Canada, England, and New 
Zealand are drawn upon throughout this article. The decisions cited may carry merely 
a persuasive weight in different jurisdictions. However, it is not the goal of this article 
to set out authoritatively the law of consent and refusal in any given jurisdiction, but 
rather to explore and understand these concepts with reference to the case law. 
 
I. MODERN LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF TRESPASS TO PERSON AND THE 
ROLE OF CONSENT 
Consent as a legal concept developed originally within the context of the law of 
trespass. Trespass is a generic term that encompasses all kinds of wrongful direct and 
intentional interferences with persons, land, and chattels (goods). Trespass to person 
comprises three separate torts--battery, assault, and the tort of false (wrongful) 
imprisonment. [FN16] This article concentrates on the concept of consent in relation 
to the tort of battery. 
The modern tort of battery has been defined as an intentional wrong "which is 
committed by intentionally bringing about a harmful or offensive contact with the 
person of another." [FN17] This will happen when the direct offensive contact with 
the body of another had been desired (purposive) or known to be substantially certain 
to result. [FN18] The tort is based on the principle *5 that other persons do not have 
the right to interfere with the person of another unless he or she validly consents to 
such an interference. [FN19] The law considers the tort of trespass to person as 
safeguarding not only the personal interest in one's physical integrity, but also as 
protecting the individual against any interference that is offensive to a reasonable 
sense of dignity and personal autonomy. 
The notion of autonomy (from Greek "autos" (self) and "nomos" (rule) expounds 
that every individual has the legal right to personal self-determination. In bioethics, 
the terms "autonomy" and "respect for autonomy" are associated with several ideas, 
such as privacy, voluntariness, choosing freely, and accepting responsibility for one's 
choices. [FN20] In law, the modern doctrine of autonomy is expressed through the 
rule that each competent individual has the right to noninterference with his or her 
choices, imposing upon others an obligation not to constrain unnecessarily the 
autonomous decisions and actions of a competent person. [FN21] 
Generally, in a medical context, the conduct of the treating physician will be 
intentional, and will have an effect of causing contact with the adult patient's body. 
The trespassory contact may lose its wrongful character if the physician can provide 
evidence of valid consent, statutory authorization, [FN22] or lawful 
justification, [FN23] but if there is no evidence on the issue, any medical interventio
no matter how benevolent in motivation, may constitute battery. 
n, 
[FN24] With respect 
to medical treatment, Justice McHugh of the High Court of Australia articulated the 
nature of the modern tort of trespass in the following way: 
It is the central thesis of the common law doctrine of trespass to the person that 
the voluntary choices and decisions of an adult person of sound mind concerning what 
is or is not done to his or her body must be respected and accepted, irrespective of 
what others, including doctors, may think is in the best interests of that particular 
person. [FN25] 
The courts regard the role of consent in trespass as generally having the effect of 
transforming what would otherwise be unlawful contact into accepted, *6 and 
acceptable, conduct. Therefore, consensual contact does not, ordinarily, amount to 
battery. [FN26] For the purposes of medical practice, the legal function of consent is 
to "provide those concerned in the treatment with a defence to a criminal charge of 
assault or battery or a civil claim for damages for trespass to the person." [FN27] 
The patient's right to make decisions about medical treatment has been identified 
with the legal right to self-determination. For instance, in the case of In re 
Conroy, [FN28] the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: "On balance, the righ
determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests, and competent 
persons generally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of 
death." 
t to self-
FN29][  
The right to refuse a life-saving treatment is commonly referred to as the "right to 
die." Justice Robins of the Ontario Court of Appeal gave the following jurisprudential 
explanation for the "right to die": 
The right of self-determination which underlies the doctrine of informed 
consent also obviously encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment. A 
competent adult is generally entitled to reject a specific treatment or all treatment, 
or to select an alternate form of treatment, even if the decision may entail risks as 
serious as death and may appear mistaken in the eyes of the medical profession or 
of the community. Regardless of the doctor's opinion, it is the patient who has the 
final say on whether to undergo the treatment. [FN30] 
In the United Kingdom, Lord Goff of Chieveley in the case of Airedale NHS 
Trust v. Bland, [FN31] defined the patient's right to refuse medical treatment 
including life-saving treatment in a similar fashion: 
[T]he principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the 
wishes of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, however 
unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life would or might be 
prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even 
though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so. 
Hence, the legal status accorded to refusal of medical treatment, including life-saving 
treatment is formulated in terms of decision-making process, whereby refusal is seen 
as negatively equipollent with a consent to treatment. But are these two concepts, 
particularly consent to, and refusal of, life-saving treatment, truly equipollent? 
 
*7 II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF CONSENT IN THE 
COMMON LAW OF TORTS 
To evaluate whether concepts of consent to, and refusal of, life-saving treatment 
are equivalent, it is important to understand the origins and the evolution of the law of 
consent. The common law of trespass developed to provide an alternative remedy to 
the deeply ingrained custom of blood feud through the law of vengeance--family feud 
known as "faida"--at the time when customary law was incapable of creating legal 
institutions that could enforce or maintain civil order within the community. The 
customary law of vengeance was based upon a highly sensitized understanding of 
family honor and loyalty combined with the basic instinct to retaliate. It generally was 
invoked for murder, adultery, violation, or rape of a married woman, violation of the 
dead, aggravated robbery, and, importantly, any insult to the honor of the family. The 
law of vengeance was open to all ranks among the Germanic and the Frankish people 
of the early Middle Ages and neither the Royal authority nor the Church were able to 
suppress it. [FN32] 
When, in 1252, the Chancery commenced to issue writs [FN33] of trespass, their 
primary purpose was to replace the customary laws of faida with the public machinery 
of legal process manifested by criminal prosecution. [FN34] The objective behind the 
original writ of trespass "vi et armis et contra pacem Domini Regis" (with force and 
arms and contrary to the King's peace) was the punishment of offenders against the 
royal peace. [FN35] Procedurally, the allegation in the pleadings that an offense 
against the royal peace had been committed, was necessary to bring the culprit before 
the royal courts, and away from the customary and baronial courts. Because forcible 
trespass involved a breach of the royal peace and so was in itself wrongful, personal 
damage was not a necessary element of liability. 
Under the Salic, Anglo-Saxon, and Anglo-Norman laws, there was a *8 procedure 
in cases involving serious offenses, whereby the guilty party could pay a 
compensation, "wergeld," (the monetary equivalent of a human life) to the victim of 
his or her kin in an attempt to preclude the risk of private war. Although the new 
machinery of justice under the Angevins tended to impose punishments without 
compensation, in cases of homicide, rape, and wounding, the old custom of wergeld-
type compensation survived but was adapted to the new judicial system of royal 
courts. [FN36] Until 1694, a defendant found liable in a civil action for trespass, 
besides being mulcted in damages in favor of the injured plaintiff, also had to pay a 
fine to the Crown. Thus, even after the civil tort of trespass evolved, it did so without 
losing its criminal law characteristic of being primarily an offense against the royal or 
public peace. [FN37] 
Initially, forcible trespass was interpreted literally--with force of arms against the 
Royal peace. It soon, however, came to be interpreted as meaning any direct and 
intentional invasion of the plaintiff's rights that may lead to instant retaliation or 
vengeance, and hence to the breach of the peace. [FN38] Because consent negates the 
threat of revenge, the plea of consent generally would have the effect of transforming 
the otherwise unlawful conduct into legally acceptable conduct. The plea of consent is 
different from the defense based on the maxim that is today known as "volenti non fit 
injuria" (no wrong is done to the one who consents), [FN39] loosely derived from 
Roman law. [FN40] The maxim was expressed by Bracton (c 1200-1268) in the De 
Exceptionibus section of his De Legibus at Consuetudinibus Angliae [FN41] as "cum 
volenti at scienti non fiat iniuria" (with consent and knowledge no injury is done). 
Though the word "scienti" was later eliminated, knowledge of the risk of injury being 
consented to has remained an element of the "volenti" defense, which is based upon 
the principle that a person should have the right to waive his or her legal rights. Sir 
Donaldson MR (as he then was), in Freeman v. Home Office, [FN42] pointed out that 
the maxim of "volenti non fit injuria" provides a bar to enforcing a cause of action; it 
does not negative the cause of action itself. [FN43] 
Originally, however, the requirement of consent did not indicate the law's concern 
for the individual's right to self-determination, or even the *9 personal right to 
physical integrity. Rather, the presence of voluntary consent indicated that the 
plaintiff was willing to forego the right to revenge. Hence, the question of consent 
was merely a factor in the enforcement of the peace of the realm. 
The law looked at consent as an evidentiary factor relating to the issue of non-
liability--the denial (in pleading terminology, a traverse) of one of the elements of the 
cause of action in trespass. [FN44] For instance, the Nottingham Eyres [FN45] rolls 
for 1329 record the pleadings, known as The Surgeon's Case, of a patient-plaintiff 
who complained that the defendant surgeon having undertaken "to cure his eye with 
herbs and other medicines," instead "put out his eye, so that he lost it, to his 
damages." According to the Launde, as the plaintiff 
put himself under his [defendant's] medicines and cure, no trespass can be found 
in him at that time, since he himself submitted to his cure, hence, if he had any action 
at all it would naturally sound in covenant broken, so we ask judgment whether such 
bill should be received. [FN46] 
The defendant pleaded that the patient-plaintiff was unable to use the writ of trespass 
for battery because he had consented to the cure, thus depriving the surgeon's conduct 
of its trepassory character. [FN47] 
In 1704, Chief Justice Holt, in the case of Cole v. Turner, [FN48] summed up the 
medieval perception of the cause of action in trespass to person when he said that "the 
least touching of another in anger is a battery." The concept of consent formed a part 
of a strictly communitarian system of values and ethics. Therefore, the right to 
consent to an interference with one's body, though protected by the law through the 
writ of trespass, was never regarded as an absolute value in itself. 
In the Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil, [FN49] first published in 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote that 
no man can be understood to consent to be wounded, chained, or imprisoned. The 
right of consent was always qualified by the policy considerations of upholding the 
public order, and was articulated in the rule that *10 where "a man license another to 
beat him, such licence is void as it is against the peace." [FN50] In the United States, 
the Superior Court of New Jersey reiterated this rule in the case of State v. 
Brown, [FN51] when it refused to regard as valid the consent of a wife to being 
beaten by her husband with his hands "and other objects" if she got drunk. The court 
reasoned that to allow such a defense would "threaten the dignity, peace, health and 
security of our country." [FN52] 
From early medieval times, the plea of consent did not suffice to exculpate the 
defendant from the charge of murder following a premeditated and intentional killing 
in the course of a fight. [FN53] Similarly, the law of maims and the crime of 
malingering are historical examples of the law setting its face against validating the 
individual's right to consent to what should be done to his or her body in these 
instances. The reason for the refusal to hold valid consent to self-mutilation or 
mutilation of the consenting person by another was to ensure that sufficient numbers 
of able young men were ready to be pressed into service with the Royal army and 
navy. The primary aim of the law of maims was to prevent the practice of beggary. 
Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, [FN54] quotes a case where a young 
and healthy youth asked his friend to maim him, so that he could beg more 
effectively. Both the young man and his friend were found guilty of mayhem. 
The personal right of refusal to an outside interference with one's bodily integrity 
was protected by law only if the refusal entailed prevention of, or a refusal to 
participate in, wrongs that were seen as threats to the communitarian principle of 
preserving public peace. While the institution of serfdom persisted, a serf had no legal 
right to refuse physical interference with his or her body, for only free men had the 
right to seek a remedy in the royal courts. Even amongst the free subjects, the two 
long-lasting exceptions to the tort of battery, namely, the right of the parent of teacher 
to chastise children and pupils, [FN55] and the husband's right to beat his wife, have 
been conspicuous examples of the law's disregard for the individual's right to refuse 
harmful and demeaning contact. 
As civil society developed, jurisprudential emphasis shifted away from the tort of 
trespass as the primary vehicle for safeguarding the royal peace. The somewhat 
restricted concept of personal freedom, as developed in classical Greece, was revived 
in the 17th century to indicate that a personally*11 free individual is a person who is 
"owner of his own body" in contrast to the slave who, although a human creature, 
does not possess such self-ownership. This articulation of personal freedom is evident 
in a number of Periclean funeral orations. [FN56] In the 17th century, John Locke 
adopted the possessory notion of personal self-ownership, as against enslavement of 
the self, [FN57] when he developed the theory of property. [FN58] Political theories 
of personal liberty and proprietary freedom propounded by John Locke and Thomas 
Hobbes, in the wake of the English Civil War, and based upon the notion of self-
ownership, became, in the course of the 18th century, a "deep-seated popular feeling 
in favour of liberty" at the expense of the power of the state. [FN59] The most 
manifest common law reflection of these popular feelings was the identification of 
personal privacy with proprietary interests and the affirmation of the principle that 
"by the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a 
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable 
to an action, though the damage be nothing." [FN60] 
In the second part of the 18th century, Sir William Blackstone extended the scope 
of the tort of trespass to person to all nonconsensual contacts by eliminating the 
requirement of voilence. Blackstone wrote that "the law cannot draw the line between 
different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage 
of it: every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, 
in any the slightest manner." [FN61] For Blackstone, the rationale of the prohibition 
of all nonconsensual contacts lay in the sacredness or inviolability of the human 
person. He argued that there exists an absolute right to personal security, vested in 
each person: " The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and 
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his 
reputation." [FN62] As an inviolate legal right, the principle of sacredness of human 
person was operative both in public and private spheres. 
 
*12 A. The Emergence of the Concept of Consent Within the Physician-Patient 
Relationship 
The Hippocratic tradition regarded the practice of medicine as art consisting of 
three components--the disease, the patient, and the physician. The Hippocratic 
physician was encouraged to aspire to personal virtues of holiness and purity, and to 
follow professional ethics of compassion, knowledge, and dedication to the patient's 
welfare, as well as the obligation to transmit medical knowledge. These principles 
were expressed in the Hippocratic Oath, [FN63] and such other writings of the Corpus 
Hippocraticum [FN64] as On the Physician, Precepts, Aphorisms, and On 
Decorum, [FN65] which together created the system of medical deontology, based 
largely on the philosophy of the Pythagorean sect. [FN66] The Pythagoreans ran
medicine together with music and mantic as supreme sciences, and believed that thei
pursuit was the best way to express "love for what is truly noble." 
ked 
r 
[FN67] 
Deontological principles imposed upon a physician a duty and "the obligatory d
of things because they are, quite simply, the right things to do" in caring for each 
individual patien
oing 
t. [FN68] 
The deontological system of medicine as presented in Corpus Hippocraticum, and 
in particular the Hippocratic Oath, [FN69] was permeated with Pythagorean 
philosophy and consequently was not a representative of the classical Greek 
philosophy as a whole. In fact, the injunction "I will neither give a deadly drug to 
anybody if asked for it, not will I make a suggestion to this effect," [FN70] was 
unique to the small Pythagorean sect whose adherents were opposed to suicide 
believing that there was an inherent value in human life. Because God allocated to 
humans their position in life as a post to be held and defended, it was a sin to disobey 
the divine command to live. [FN71] Ludwig Edelstein, one of the greatest scholars of 
ancient Greek and Roman medical literature, pointed out that in the eyes of a 
Hippocratic physician, *13 unless the physician abstained from suggesting or 
assisting in a patient's suicide, the physician, no less than the patient, was guilty of 
moral and religious transgression. [FN72] The Pythagorean view of suicide was 
opposed to that of Platonists, Cynics, and Stoics, all of whom held suicide permissible 
for the diseased. Although Aristotelians believed that it was cowardly to succumb to 
bodily pain, and the Epicureans insisted that people should not be subdued by illness, 
they condoned suicide in other circumstances. [FN73] In Roman times, Seneca 
expressed the Stoic view of suicide in the following terms: "When either nature 
demands my breath again, or reason bids me dismiss it, I will quit this life, calling all 
to witness that no one's freedom, my own least of all, has been impaired through 
me." [FN74] 
One may ask why, in view of its minority status, [FN75] the Hippocratic school 
with its life-oriented philosophy, prevailed over the more populous medical schools or 
sects that were better attuned to the accepted mores of the times. [FN76] One 
explanation may be that when it came to the "crunch," patients preferred to seek help 
from physicians who adhered to a strict code of ethical principles, which prohibited 
medically assisted suicide. Nevertheless, general tolerance of suicide in Greek and 
Roman society meant that Hippocratic physicians would have encountered patients 
who either asked for assistance with suicide, or who, wishing to die, refused to 
comply with the prescribed therapy. Hippocratic physicians were advised not to 
undertake treatment of persons in the terminal stages of their disease, nor could they 
impose therapy upon those who did not want their services. But there also would have 
been patients who, having sought medical help, refused or were unable to comply 
with the prescribed therapeutic regime. The Hippocratic physicians stressed the 
importance of nursing in the healing process. They made frequent visits to their 
patients, and tended to leave one of their pupils behind to watch over and help with 
medical care for the sick. [FN77] They also provided a room in their own homes for 
treating patients who lived too far away for adequate supervision. [FN78] *14 The 
provision of nursing care was not only beneficial to those patients who cooperated 
with the physician in wishing to get well, but was also helpful in overcoming or 
mitigating passive refusal or noncompliance with treatment. 
It does not appear that seeking an express consent to treatment from the patient 
constituted an integral part of the Hippocratic tradition, which was based on a 
covenantal relationship between physician and patient, rather than on the modern 
principle of consensual partnership. Central to a covenantal relationship is the ethical 
principle of trust with its corresponding duties and obligations. The Hippocratic 
physician-patient relationship presupposed that "if the physician [was] going to help, 
his relationship to his patient must be that of the person in command to the one who 
obeys." [FN79] Probably the most famous of the Hippocratic Aphorisms affirms that 
"Life is short, art is long; opportunity is fleeting, experiment is dangerous; judgment 
is difficult. It is not enough for the physician to do what is necessary, the cooperation 
of the patient and the attendants must be secured, and circumstances must be 
favourable." [FN80] 
The relationship in which a patient was expected to cooperate and to put "himself 
and 'his all' into the hands of the physician" involved a recognition that the patient's 
trust reposed in the physician encompassed not only the latter's knowledge and skills, 
but also the person. The principle of the patient's trust imposed upon the physician 
obligations that included the code of personal ethics prescribed in the Hippocratic 
Oath, and other writings of the Corpus Hippocraticum. These writings present the 
model of a physician as a composite of a person adhering to the ideals of the 
Pythagorean philosophy [FN81] with the Aristotelian qualities of a "gentleman" 
(kindness, self-control, regularity of habits, justness and fairness, a proper and good 
behavior), [FN82] as well as the Stoic virtues of wisdom [FN83] and charity toward 
all people--free citizens, slaves, and barbarians, including those who are 
impecunious. [FN84] 
The Hippocratic ideas persisted in an unbroken line following the decline of 
Roman civilization through the early Middle Ages. Even though *15 the Christian 
Church authorities did not approve of pagan writings, some segments of the 
Hippocratic Corpus were known, and treatises on the ethics and etiquette of medicine 
written by monks in North European monasteries rendered into a "Christianized" 
version the pivotal deontological aspects of the Corpus Hippocraticum. [FN85] The 
essential model of the covenantal physician-patient relationship based on a patient's 
obedience and trust also was adopted by Moslem and Arabic-speaking Jewish 
physicians who became the intellectual heirs, custodians, and translators of the works 
of Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Galen into Hebrew and Arabic. [FN86] The classical 
tradition in Europe was revitalized when the scholars of the University of Salerno, 
which was created as "civitas Hippocratice" at the end of the 9th century, began to 
translate into medieval Latin, the Hebrew and Arabic manuscripts containing the 
works of Greek, Roman, and Jewish medical writers. [FN87] The medieval Latin 
translations, however, focused upon the practical aspects of medicine, rather than on 
general theoretical principles. [FN88] 
The absence of any discussion of the issue of consent in the early Middle Ages 
reflected the feudal law's preoccupation with landed property, the intricacies of the 
vassalage system, and fiscal privileges. It was only with the advent of the Renaissance 
and loosening of feudal controls of obligation and privilege that there emerged a 
philosophical shift toward examination of the rules governing the relationships 
between individuals--as distinguished from collective rights and duties of the 
representative "estates," social classes, and industrial guilds. The orientation of the 
law toward an individual was accelerated by the rediscovery in 1100 in Italy of the 
Corpus iuris civilis of the Emperor Justinian, which was originally compiled between 
533 and 556 CE. The opening sentences of the Institutiones (Institutes) of Justinian: 
"Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens" (Justice is the 
constant and perpetual purpose of giving to each his due), and "Iuris prudentia est 
divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia" (Jurisprudence 
is the knowledge of things divine and human, the science of just and the 
unjust) [FN89] became the foundation of the modern jurisprudence. [FN90] 
*16 The principles of the medieval Roman or "civil" law based on the Corpus 
Iuris were taught in all European universities from Salerno and Bologna, to Paris, 
Oxford, and Cambridge. [FN91] Late medieval philosophers, many of whom studied 
Roman law at university, were the first to analyze, though from different perspectives, 
the internal experiences of man as an individual. [FN92] These 13th and 14th century 
thinkers, amongst them Giovanni Bonaventura, Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus, 
Johannes Eckhart, and William of Ockham, paved the way for the revival of classical 
Greek and Roman learning, [FN93] and a critical re-evaluation of medieval scientific, 
moral, philosophical, and social dogma in light of the earlier conventions. In a way, 
the Renaissance rediscovered an individual as a physical being--an object to be 
studied by anatomists, described by philosophers, and portrayed by artists. 
For centuries, midwives, herbalists, gymnastic trainers, "purifiers," and purveyors 
of charms, incantations, and drugs--as well as physicians--claimed the ability to heal 
the sick. At the same time, it is known that at least since the beginning of the 15th 
century, English physicians desired to have standards of entry into their profession 
regulated. In 1421, the physicians placed before parliament a petition requesting that 
"no man, of no manner, estate, degree, or condition, practice in Physic, from this time 
forward, but he have long time used the Schools of Physic within some University, 
and be graduated in the same." [FN94] Under the statutes and the common law of 
medieval England, anyone could practice medicine or surgery with the consent of the 
patient. However, when the patient died while under the care of a person who was not 
licensed by the Church, guild, or university to practice medicine or surgery, such a 
death was held to be a felony. [FN95] 
In the England of the 16th century, medicine was taught as a postgraduate course 
in the Arts faculties of Oxford and Cambridge and consisted mainly of exposition of 
classical authorities such as Aristotle and Galen with little scientific instruction or 
clinical training. When the (Royal) College of Physicians of London was created in 
1518 under the Chancellorship of *17 Cardinal Wolsey, [FN96] in the preamble to the 
College's charter, Henry VIII expressed a desire that the Royal Physicians should 
promote medical learning through encouragement of the new Italian medical 
humanism. [FN97] The primary purpose of the College of Physicians was to control 
the practice of medicine. At first, however, the influence of the College of Physicians 
was confined to the metropolitan area extending seven miles from the City of 
London. [FN98] 
In 1523, the jurisdiction of The Royal College of Physicians extended to the 
whole of England, and the College was granted judicial powers to regulate 
educational qualifications and standards of medical practice amongst its 
members. [FN99] Yet, for a long time, the powers of the College, particularly o
of London, were more apparent than real. This was because although the Royal 
College was granted power to adjudicate on the candidate's educational compet
practice medicine, the bishops had retained power to grant the license to practice 
medicine within their dioceses. 
utside 
ence to 
[FN100] Nevertheless, in the course of the following 
two centuries, ethical codes aiming to lift the standards of medical practice were 
revised and adapted to the spirit of the nascent Enlightenment with its "quest for 
immutable laws of nature, of man, and in philosophy." [FN101] Guided by reason 
rather than religion and received dogma, the Enlightenment placed at the center of its 
concerns the nature of individual rights and liberties within civil society. [FN102] 
Physicians, whether members of the College or not, began to critically review 
contemporary medical practice. [FN103] In 1556, John Securis published a book 
entitled A Detection and Querimonie of the Daily Enormities and Abuses Committed 
in Physick, which was aimed at reforming the morality and practice of 
medicine. [FN104] In the 17th century, Thomas Sydenham, an *18 adherent o
new empirical scientific method, known as the "English Hippocrates," stressed that 
the aim of medicine was to treat the patient, not disease. 
f the 
[FN105] Subsequently, in 
1711, a London physician, Dr. Bernard Mandeville, wrote A Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions, Vulgarly Called the Hypo in Men and 
Vapours in Women, which was intended for the education of patients as well as 
physicians. [FN106] 
In his influential Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician
published in 1772, John Gregory 
, 
[FN107] argued that it was the ethical and 
professional conduct of physicians that enabled the fusion of the two divergent 
conceptions of the profession of medicine to be sustained, namely the concept of 
medicine as "an art the most beneficial and important to mankind, or as a trade by 
which a considerable body of men gain their subsistence." [FN108] Gregory stressed 
that the scientific learning and professional skill of every physician must be tempere
by "the obligation to humanity, patience, attention, discretion, secrecy, and honour, 
which he lies under to his patients." 
d 
[FN109] Moreover, "it is a physician's duty to d
everything in his power that is not morally criminal to save the life of his 
patient," 
o 
[FN110] though " e ven in cases where his skill as a physician can be of no 
further avail, his presence and assistance as a man and as a friend may be grateful and 
useful, both to the patient and his nearest relations." [FN111] 
Gregory noted that within the covenantal physician-patient relationship "the 
government of a physician over his patient should undoubtedly be great, but an 
absolute government very few patients will submit to." [FN112] He defined the rights 
of p
 
it 
ar what they have to say with attention, and to examine it with 
atients in a covenantal relationship in the following way: 
Every man has the right to speak where his life or his health is concerned, and 
every man may suggest what he thinks tends to save the life of his friend. It becomes
them to interpose with politeness, and deference to the judgment of the physician; 
becomes him to he
candour. [FN113] 
The physician must respect his patients' opinions and therapeutic preferences, *19 
pro
t 
not 4]
vided that these preferences are consistent with the patient's safety: 
Sometimes a patient himself, sometimes one of his friends, will propose to the 
physician a remedy, which, they believe, may do him service. Their proposal may be 
a good one; it may even suggest to the ablest physician, what, perhaps, till then, migh
 have occurred to him. It is undoubtedly, therefore, his duty to adopt it. [FN11  
ons of 
Consent to medical treatment, as we understand this concept today, was not 
specifically articulated in the medical treatises, professional codes, and regulati
early modern England. [FN115] Nevertheless, the notion of patient consent to 
treatment not only as a legal requirement but also as an ethical construct must hav
been appreciated, because its legal and ethical significance within the physician-
patient relationship was discussed in the 1767 English case of Slater v. Baker & 
Stapleton. 
e 
[FN116] This case appears to be a first instance in which the court affirmed
the principle that nonconsensual contac
 
t in the context of medical treatment ought to 
be regarded as a legal wrong. [FN117] 
The plaintiff, Slater, sued a surgeon and an apothecary in special action on the 
case [FN118] for "ignorantly and unskilfully" --over his protests-- refracturing "the 
callous" (bony material present during healing) of his leg after it was set and plac
in an "extension" instrument thereby causing him an injury. The medical expert 
witnesses called by the plaintiff testified that it was contrary to the standard practice 
to refracture a leg unless the bone was setting very badly. They also testified that the 
use of the extension instrument of the kind employed by the defendants to stretch and
straighten the limb during healing was not approved of by the profession. A surg
expert witness swore "that if the plaintiff was capable of bearing his foot on the 
ground, he would have disunited the callous if it had been desired by him, but in no 
case whatsoeve
ing it 
 
eon 
r without the consent of the patient." [FN119] The jury awarded the 
plai
gnorance 
t lay 
ntiff £500. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that because there was no evidence of i
or want of skill (the defendant Baker was apparently the first surgeon in St. 
Bartholomew's Hospital in London for 20 years), the essence *20 of the complain
in the fact that the leg "was broke without the plaintiff's consent." Therefore, the 
appropriate writ was that of trespass "vi at armis" (battery). This was a technical 
argument designed to defeat the plaintiff's action on the issue of suitability of the writ: 
if the writ did not fit the facts of the case, it could be quashed, and, in accordance
the maxim "no writ, no remedy," the plaintiff would be left without legal relief. 
However, the court of the King's Bench rejected the arguments of the defendants. 
Referring to the evidence about the good character of Baker, the full court noted that 
"many men skilful in their profession have frequently acted out of the commo
for the sake of trying experiments. It seems as if Mr. Baker wanted to try an 
experiment with this new instrument." 
 with 
n way 
[FN120] As such, his action was rash "an
who acts rashly acts ignorantly." 
d he 
[FN121] The full court refused to nonsuit the 
plai
r 
 
 
. [FN122]
ntiff on the basis that the proper writ would have been trespass "vi at armis":  
In answer to this, it appears from the evidence of the surgeons that it was imprope
to disunite the callous without consent; this is the usage and law of surgeons: then it 
was ignorance and unskilfulness in that very particular, to do contrary to the rule of 
the profession, what no surgeon ought to have done; and indeed it is reasonable that a
patient should be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and
put himself in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation  
 the 
f 
resumably in violation of the code of the Barber-Surgeon's 
Com
fter 
It is interesting to note the 18th century court's disapproval of medical 
experimentation on human subjects without their consent. The court considered
surgeons' failure to explain the experimental nature of the procedure, and their 
disregard of the patient's refusal to undergo the operation as an "improper" breach o
professional conduct, p
pany of London. 
Rather than elaborating upon strictly legal principles relating to consent, the court 
explained why it is bad professional practice to keep patients ignorant of the nature of 
proposed therapy, and to treat them without consent. Two and a quarter centuries a
the judgment in Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, Lord Donaldson of Lymington 
MR, [FN123] provided a very similar description of the clinical purpose of consent to
medical treatment. He said that consent of the patient is essential in clinical practice 
because it encourages the cooperation of the patient and ensures the patient's faith--o
at least *21 confidence--in the
 
r 
 efficacy of the treatment, and thus contributes to the 
treatment's success. [FN124] 
Because of the nature of the writ under which the plaintiff pursued his cause of 
action in Slater, the question of whether the treating practitioners' failure to explain 
the nature of the intervention and the disregard of the patient's refusal to undergo the 
treatment should sound in damages in trespass remained unanswered. The plaintiff's 
action was essentially to recover damages for the bodily damage he had suffered as
result of the defendants' refracturing the leg and then placing it in an experimental
apparatus. The injury to his dignitary interests, as manifest through the surgeons' 
disregard of his refusal, was treated not as an ultimate issue, but as an e
 a 
 
videntiary 
factor in the determination of the defendants' liability for malpractice. 
In Thomas Percival's seminal book on medical ethics, [FN125] which was 
originally published in 1803, [FN126] Percival does not refer specifically to the c
of Slater v. Baker & Stapleton. Nevertheless, he may have had in mind practic
similar to those that gave rise to the lawsuit when he wrote that experimental 
treatments in medicine and surgery should not be undertaken without proper 
consultation between all concerned, and only in accordance with sound reasons. 
Although it has been claimed that research and experimentation are a normal p
clinical practice, in the sense that "every clinical decision ought to involve an 
experiment," 
ase 
es 
art of 
[FN127] there is a fundamental distinction between an ordinary 
therapeutic physician-patient relationship, and a relationship that exists between 
physician-investigators and patient-subjects. Within the therapeutic physician-patient 
relationship, the focus of the physician's attention and care is the patient and hi
best interests. When this relationship is altered to accommodate experimental 
treatment, the physician-investig
s or her 
ator has to consider factors that are extraneous to the 
patient's best interests. [FN128] 
Percival does not discuss the specific issue of consent to, or refusal of, a propo
treatment by a patient. However, he urges respect for the patient's wis
sed 
hes even in 
circ
o 
udices of the sick are not to be contemned [sic], 
umstances where the treating physician may disagree with them: 
The feelings and emotions of the patients, under critical circumstances, require t
be known and to be attended to, no less than the symptoms of their diseases. Thus, 
*22 extreme timidity, with respect to venaesection, contraindicates its use, in certain 
cases and constitutions. Even the prej
or opposed with harshness. [FN129] 
Lik
ful 
, 
 
paid to 
nd the 
con
ewise, Percival makes the following observations: 
The use of quack medicines should be discouraged by the faculty, as disgrace
to the profession, injurious to health, and often destructive even of life. Patients
however, under lingering disorders, are sometimes obstinately bent on having 
recourse to such as they see advertised, or hear recommended, with a boldness and 
confidence, which no intelligent physician dares to adopt with respect to the means 
that he prescribes. In these cases, some indulgence seems to be required to a credulity
that is insurmountable: And the patient should neither incur the displeasure of the 
physician, nor be entirely deserted by him. He may be apprised of the fallacy of his 
expectations, whilst assured, at the same time, that diligent attention should be 
the process of the experiment he is so unadvisedly making of himself, a
sequent mischiefs, in any, obviated as timely as possible. [FN130] 
Percival adds that "certain active preparations, the nature, composition, and effec
of which are well known, ought not to be proscribed as quack medicines." 
ts 
][FN131  
a 
g of vulnerabilities, wishes, and needs of those 
who
sons 
The writing of Gregory and Percival illustrate the core virtues that characterize 
humane and benevolent physician of the Enlightenment: scientific approach to 
evaluation and application of medicinal drugs combined with compassionate care 
based on nonjudgmental understandin
 suffer from illness and disease. 
Insofar as Percival was opposed to providing the patient with theoretical rea
for the treatment and the nature of remedies to be prescribed, [FN132] modern 
bioethicists would describe his attitude as "paternalistic," based on an assumption t
the physician knows better than anyone, including the patient, what is bes
patient. John Gregory, in his Lecture II, discussed certain psychological, 
sociopolitical, and religious considerations why it was wise for the 18th centur
physician to avoid disclosure to the patient of the properties of medicines and 
remedies to be employed in the course of therapy. 
hat 
t for the 
y 
[FN133] Gregory noted that t
were cases "where it may be proper to acquaint a patient with the nature of the 
remedies, as there are sometimes peculiarities in a constitution, in regard both to 
quality and quantity of the medicine, which a physician ought to be informed of 
before he prescribes it." 
here 
the 
[FN134] The decision to forego explanations probably w
*23 expression of professional honesty, for it was often more honest for an 18th 
century physician--whose practice was guided as much by intuition and clinical 
experience as by scientific knowledge--to say little or nothing about the benefits
risks involved in a particular course of therapy or medication, than to provide a 
as an 
 and 
spurious pseudo-scientific explanation. These considerations, however, did not relieve 
medical practitioners from an ethical obligation to inform patients that a proposed 
treatment was novel or experimental. 
The term "consent," applying to interpersonal relationships, is absent from the 
texts of Gregory and Percival. In fact, it was only toward the end of the 18th century 
that Henry Ballow defined this word in his Treatise of Equity, which was published 
posthumously, in 1793, with annotations by John Fonblanque. [FN135] The authors 
were influenced by the theories of Hugo Grotius, who published De Iure Belli ac 
Pacis (on the Law of War and Peace) in 1625, and by Samuel Pufendorf, who built 
upon the earlier work of Grotius, in authoring two treatises De Iure Naturae et 
Gentium Libri VIII (1672) and De Officio Hominis et Civis Iuxta Legem Naturalem 
Libri II (1673). [FN136] Grotius and Pufendorf sought to establish a body of certain 
basic and universal principles that would be binding on all people, irrespective of the 
time and the place in which they lived. [FN137] They argued that these principles, 
like, for example, the obligation to carry out one's promises, had the same certainty 
and generality as a proposition in mathematics. [FN138] The body of the basic or 
axiomatic principles was called natural law, in the sense that they were arrived at by 
means of rational study and critical observation of human nature and relationships. 
Concrete rules, which applied to specific areas of law, could be deduced from general 
concepts and axioms. According to Grotius, the axiomatic principles of natural law 
were drawn from "the principles of nature, or common consent." [FN139] In English, 
this theory of the "law of reason" (Vernunftrecht) is referred to as the School of 
Natural Law. Its legal methodology and ideology were closely linked with the 
political and philosophical ideas of the Englightenment. 
It is of significance, however, that the legal analysis of the nature of consent as an 
aspect of interpersonal relationships should have been undertaken *24 first in the 
context of the developing law of contract refracted through equity jurisprudence. In 
the late 18th century, the gist of the law of contract was perceived as involving the 
terms of an agreement made by consenting minds of the contracting parties who were 
presumed to be equal. The focus of the law of contract was the damage occasioned by 
the breach of a contractual term. Equity's role was to concentrate upon the persons 
who are parties to the contract in order to ensure that "no one may be gainer by 
another's loss," [FN140] in the sense that in a relationship in which a transfer of 
proprietary interests is effected, the stronger party should not be allowed to take 
advantage of the weaker one. Originally, the law emphasized the consensus of mind 
by the contracting parties as an indication of true consent. This approach was known 
as the "subjective theory" of contract. Today the preferred doctrine is the "objective 
theory," whereby the law is less concerned with the true intentions of the parties and 
more with outward manifestations of those intentions. [FN141] Eventually, the nature 
of consent within the physician-patient relationship would come to be examined in the 
light of this modern theory. 
In the Treatise of Equity, Ballow and Fonblanque discussed the nature of consent 
in the context of the law of agreements pertaining to transfer of property. However, 
their analysis had wider implications. Grotius, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, [FN142] 
defined consent as "an act of reason accompanied with deliberation." [FN143] Ballow 
enlarged upon Grotius' definition by suggesting that deliberation indicated "the mind 
weighing, as in balance, the good and evil on either side." [FN144] Fonblanque in the 
annotations, relying on Pufendorf's De Iure Naturae et Gentium Libri, explained the 
constituent elements of consent in the following way: "Every true consent supposes, 
1st, a physical power: 2dly, a moral power of consenting; 3dly, a serious and free use 
of them." [FN145] 
In the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, the law considers consent to 
medical treatment as "real" or "valid" for the purposes of battery if it is given by a 
competent person who has made the decision voluntarily upon being informed in 
broad terms of the nature of the procedure that is to be performed. [FN146] This 
approach differs from the position adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia *25 in Canterbury v. Spence, [FN147] which explained that 
to be valid, the consent has to be "informed": "True consent to what happens to one's 
self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate 
knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each." [FN148] 
This modern description of the nature of consent may have its source in a first 
century letter by Pliny the Younger to Catilius Severus. In the letter, Pliny describes 
the suicide of Titius Aristo who, suffering from protracted illness, called Pliny 
together with a few intimate friends and told them "to ask the doctors what the 
outcome of his illness would be, so that if it was to be fatal he could deliberately put 
an end to his life, though he would carry on with the struggle if it was only to be long 
and painful . . . ." [FN149] Pliny commended Titus Aristo for this course of action, 
and commented that " m any people have his impulse and urge to forestall death, but 
the ability to examine critically the arguments for dying, and to accept or reject the 
idea of living or not, is a mark of a truly great mind." [FN150] The original Latin text 
places more emphasis on the reasoning process, and speaks in terms of "deliberating 
and weighing one's causes for such decision," and the "counsel of reason." [FN151] 
However, it seems that a more immediate source for the legal notion of informed 
consent lay in the judicial understanding of the three essential elements of consent to 
contractual relations originally specified by Ballow, who said that consent must be 
"an act of reason" involving "deliberation" with the "the mind weighing as in balance 
the good and evil on either side." [FN152] Indeed in Canterbury v. Spence, the court 
noted that "one of the difficulties with analysis in terms of 'informed consent' is its 
tendency to imply that what is decisive is the degree of the patient's 
comprehension." [FN153] Both Ballow's definition and the decision in Canterbur
emphasize the consenting person's cognitive capacity. In today's parlance, conse
medical treatment has to be "an act of reason" in the sense that the consenting person 
must be shown to have realized that he or she is being asked to make a decision about 
medical treatment, has understood the information relevant to making this decisi
and appreciates how this information would apply to his or her current 
y 
nt to 
on, 
ituation. [FN154]s  
*26
nd 
looked at an 
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lped 
e as an expression of communitarian interests in 
rela
 
 B. The Influence of the Philosophical Writings of John Stuart Mill 
The Blackstonian principle of the sacredness of the human body helped to exte
the focus of the tort of battery from the inviolability of public peace, in which an 
individual was seen as a component of wider societal structure, to encompass the 
principle of the right to personal inviolability. However, Blackstone still 
individual and the right to personal integrity from the perspective of the 
communitarian interest of social harmony in the public sphere. Although the principle
of personal inviolability or sacredness emphasized the right to be free from physica
interference, it did not, automatically, entail the right to personal autonomy. It was 
philosophers like John Locke, Charles Montesquieu and John Stuart Mill who he
to invert the viewpoint by introducing the notion of personal liberty based upon 
delimitation of the power of the stat
tion to the individual. [FN155] 
In his influential essay On Liberty, [FN156] Mill argued that individuals should 
be amenable to society and its laws only when their conduct is based on choices that
impinge on or concern others. "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant." 
 
[FN157] Mill argued that society has full jurisdiction when an adult person's
conduct is "other-regarding," that is, when the person's decisions affect prejudi
the interests of others. When the individual's conduct is "self-regarding" in the sense 
that it affects the interests of no person besides himself or herself--the individual's 
freedom to make the choice ought to be absolute because "over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign." 
 
cially 
[FN158] When the person's conduc
an effect upon the interests of other adults of "ordinary understanding," he or she must
seek their "free, voluntary and undeceiv
t has 
 
ed consent." [FN159] In all such cases, 
according to Mill, "there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action 
and stand the consequences." [FN160] 
John Stuart Mill's doctrine that each individual "is the proper guardian of his own 
health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual," [FN161] has to be read in the conte
of his discussion of legitimacy of the power of the state. Mill explained that the only 
legitimate power of the state was that derived from the needs of individuals. The 
individuals, as he and other philosophers and essayists of that era saw them, seem
have been endowed with the characteristics *27 of an English gentlemen--they 
financially independent, 
xt 
 to 
were 
[FN162] rational, and mature. Mill emphasized that his 
doctrine of individual liberty was "meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties," [FN163] as distinct from those 
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, [and who] must be
protected against their own actions as well as against exte
 
rnal injury. For the same 
reas h on, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in whic
the race itself may be considered as its nonage. [FN164] 
Hence, the individual sovereignty was not a natural right of all human beings, 
rather it applied only to certain mature individuals who had the ability to exercise 
their "higher faculties," and who valued personal freedom to conduct their aff
other individuals through voluntary agreements based on cooperation, consent, and 
contract, and without the interference of the state. Such individuals were the 
exemplars of a "person m
airs with 
ost interested in his own well-being" [FN165] and it was to 
them that Mill accorded the absolute right to decide what to do "with his life for his 
own benefit." [FN166] 
From the jurisprudential point of view, the notion that the individual alone-- rath
than society as an institution--has the right to make decisions concerning person
well-being was radical, because it implied that such decisions ought to be accorded
legal recognition and protection. Traditionally, the only explicit right of re
protected by law was the right of refusal by proprietors 
er 
al 
 
fusal 
[FN167] to part with or to 
allow strangers to interfere with their proprietary interests without lawful 
authorization. [FN168] The implication of Mill's philosophy was that an individual 
had e 
ers, to 
g with *28 
him
 a personal proprietorship over his or her body and the consequent right to refus
beneficial interference in matters relating to personal well-being: 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for 
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of oth
do so would be wise, or even right. There are good reasons for remonstratin
, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for 
compelling him, or visiting him any evil, in case he do otherwise. [FN169] 
Mill's idea that the individual has an unqualified right to refuse beneficial 
interference in matters relating to personal well-being appears not to have been ba
on the principle that all individuals have a natural right to personal liberty. Rathe
was grounded in the utilitarian principle that unless individuals are left free from 
social pressure when they decide on matters that concern their private interests, 
including their own well-being, society may find it more difficult to achieve the 
for which it exists. 
sed 
r, it 
ends 
[FN170] This is a quintessential consequentialist position whereby 
the 
 
choice of the right to appropriate action is determined by the desirability or 
appropriateness of its consequences. 
The utilitarian societal aims and ends espoused by Mill were formulated at the 
turn of the 19th century by Jeremy Bentham, a close friend of John Stuart's father. 
Bentham's utilitarian doctrine was founded upon three principles, the first of which
states that all human efforts as an organized society should be aimed at maximizing 
happiness and minimizing suffering in the world. The second principle, known as 
hedonistic principle, defines the happiness of sentient human beings as the pleasure, 
or the absence of pain, and suffering as pain, or the absence of pleasure. [FN171] 
According to the third principle, the principle of impartiality, pleasures and pains of 
all sentient beings ought to be taken into consideration when decisions are made. In 
relation to the actual decision-making process, strict utilitarian philosophy does not 
per hips, mit any favoritism or privileges based upon mutual feelings, family relations
or shared nationalities. [FN172] 
Mill conceived personal liberty in terms of the classical freedom of action, 
liberum arbitrium--the freedom of choice between two or more desirable objects or
ways of conduct. The notion of liberum arbitrium is predicated upon choice between 
things equally possible and available to us in statu nascendi as mere 
potentialities. 
 
[FN173] Actions can be justified only in terms of the outcome that 
would lead to the greatest utility in the sense of satisfaction or happiness. The rele
choice may be between pain and pleasure or suffering and well-being but it would 
always be in the context of *29 survival--death is final, and does not involve any 
potentiality. For example, St. Augustine (354-430) in De Libero Arbitrio, 
vant 
[FN174] 
argued that those who believe they chose non-being when they commit suicide are in
error because they chose a form of being that will come about one day anyhow, an
they chose peace that can exist only as a form or aspect of being. 
 
d 
[FN175] Centuries 
later, Immanuel Kant in the essay On Suicide wrote that "man's freedom cannot 
sub  sist except on condition which is immutable. This condition is that man not use his
freedom against himself to his destruction." [FN176] 
Whereas the first principle of utilitarianism is vital to the understanding of Mill's 
philosophical doctrine of personal liberty, the second and third principles of 
enthamite utilitarianism have profoundly influenced modern judicial approaches to 
III. 
al's 
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consent and refusal as legal concepts. 
 
THE LAW OF CONSENT IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIRST TWO 
DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
John Stuart Mill's philosophical ideas of personal liberty involving the individu
absolute right to decide what to do "with his life for his own benefit" were reflected in
judgments delivered in two cases in the United States. In the 1905 case of Pratt v. 
Davis, [FN177] a husband placed his wife, Mrs. Davis, in a sanatorium for treatmen
for epilepsy. The defendant physician found that Mrs. Davis' "uterus was contracted 
and lacerated, and that the lower portion of the rectum was diseased." 
t 
[FN178] He 
operated for "these difficulties." The patient did not improve, and some 10 weeks later 
she was returned to the sanatorium, where the physician performed a hysterectomy 
operation upon her. This operation was performed without the prior consent of M
Davis or her husband. 
rs. 
[FN179] The following extract from the physician's testimony 
is quoted in the judgment: "I worked her deliberately and systematically, taking 
chances which she did not realize the full aspect of, deliberately and calmly deceiving 
the woman; that is I did not tell her the whole truth." [FN180] 
The defense argued that the patient was incompetent to grant consent becaus
suffered from epilepsy, and that a patient who consults a medical practitioner 
him implied license to do whatever in the exercise *30 of his judgment may be 
necessary." 
e she 
"gives 
[FN181] The judges rejected both arguments, and found that the 
def
 
 
egrity of his patient by 
a m
endant by acting without consent was liable in trespass. The case before the 
appellate court was reported in the Chicago Legal News in the following way: 
Under a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest right, which
underlies all others--the right to the inviolability of his person, in other words, his 
right to himself--is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily 
forbids a physician or surgeon, however skilful [sic] or eminent, who has been asked 
to examine, diagnose, advise and prescribe (which are at least necessary first steps in
treatment and care), to violate without permission the bodily int
ajor or capital operation, placing him under an anaesthetic for that purpose, and 
operating on him without his consent and knowledge. [FN182] 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota cited the above passage with approval when in 
1905 it decided the case of Mohr v. Williams. [FN183] In this case, the patient, Anna
Mohr, consented to have an operation performed on her right ear. In the course of the 
procedure, the treating physician decided that it was the patient's left ear that needed
the surgery. The physician's nonconsensual operation on Ms. Mohr's left ear resu
in serious impairment of her hearing in that ear. She sued the physician for bat
The court affirmed the jury's award of $14,322.50 in damages, holding that the 
medical practitioner should have obtained Ms. Mohr's express consent before 
operating on her left
 
 
lted 
tery. 
 ear. In the context of this ruling, the court referred to a passage 
from
e law recognizes as the legal one. Consent, therefore, of an 
ind the 
 section 375 of 1 Kinkead on Torts, which articulated the position of the law in 
relation to consent. 
The patient must be the final arbiter as to whether he will take his chances with 
the operation, or take his chances of living without it. Such is the natural right of 
every individual, which th
ividual must be either expressly or impliedly given before a surgeon may have 
right to operate. [FN184] 
The court considered two exceptions to the rule that there must be an express 
consent to medical treatment. [FN185] Under the first exception, the law ma
consent in circumstances where a person is injured to the extent of being rendered 
unconscious and the injuries require prompt medical attention. Under these 
conditions, "a physician . . . would be justified in applying such medical or surgical 
treatment as might reasonably be necessary *31 for the preservation of the injured 
person's life or limb." 
y imply 
[FN186] The second exception is really a variation of the first--
when in the course of an operation to which the patient had consented, "the physic
should discover conditions not anticipated before the operation was commenced
which, if not removed, would endanger the life or he
ian 
, and 
alth of the patient, he would, 
though no express consent was obtained or given, be justified in extending the 
operation to remove and overcome them." [FN187] 
In 1913, the Civil Court of Appeals of Texas in Rishworth v. Moss [FN188] 
consolidated these two exceptions into a general rule when it stated that "there must 
be consent in every case, except in an emergency when the delay to obtain consent 
would endanger the life or health of the patient." [FN189] In subsequent American 
cases, as well as in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the courts uph
rule that unless the circumstances of emergency apply, a medical or surgical 
procedure
eld the 
 that goes beyond the scope of a patient's express consent should be 
regarded as trespass, even when there was no evidence of an express 
prohibition. [FN190] 
The legal justification for the emergency exception to the law of consent w
applied to unconscious patients has changed from that of implied consent to the 
principle of necessity--the medical intervention must be shown to have been 
necessary "for the protection of the plaintiff's health and possibly his life." 
hen 
[FN191] 
The doctrine of necessity, as an exception to the law of consent, allows for provision 
of nonvoluntary therapy, in circumstances when the patient is not in a position to ha
or to express any views on the proposed clinical management. 
ve 
[FN192] This doctrine
also appli
 
es to patients who are incapable of giving consent by reason of minority, 
and persons whose state of mind is such as to render their apparent consent 
invalid. [FN193] 
The common-law doctrine of necessity was developed at the time when palliation 
was not regarded as an important aspect of medical care, and the study of pain relief 
was not very well advanced. Pain and suffering were *32 accepted as part and parcel 
of the human condition--one was born in pain, lived in pain, and was expected to die 
in pain. Modern medicine understands (or ought to understand) that the experience
pain is detrimental to the patient's physical welfare and need not be endured. The ai
of multi-modal pain management is to achieve satisfactory pain relief through th
administration of adequate dosage and timing of analgesics (including long-acting 
oral preparations of morphine), palliative radiotherapy, chemotherapy, surgery, 
hormone therapy, anesthetic and neurosurgical techniques, physical treatment, and 
psychological support for the patient and his or her family. 
 of 
m 
e 
[FN194] Yet, palliativ
medical therapy would not come within t
e 
he ambit of the defense of necessity because 
its a
 
im is to prevent harm to the patient's quality of life rather than to protect the 
patient's life or health in the strict sense. 
The facts in both the Pratt case and the Williams case, involved absence of 
consent to the particular treatment, rather than an explicit refusal thereof. In the 1913
case of Rolater v. Strain, [FN195] Mattie Inez Strain consented to an operation to 
drain an infection that developed after she stepped upon a nail which penetrated the 
big toe of her right foot. In the course of an operation that was performed under an 
anesthetic, the physician removed the sesamoid bone from her toe. Ms. Strain sued the
medical practitioner in trespass, claiming that there was an agreement between them 
that "no bones should be removed." 
 
[FN196] She was awarded $1000. On appeal, the 
court upheld the patient's right to refuse certain procedures, and the physician's duty 
to act within the strict limits imposed by the ambit of consent when it is granted. Th
problem with the Rolater decision, however, is that the Supreme Court of Oklahom
misapplied this jurisprudential principle to the facts before it. The court seemed 
persist in a belief that sesamoid bones are an integral part of the human 
anatomy, 
e 
a 
to 
[FN197] when in fact--as the defendant physician rightly pointed out--t
are nodules of bone that may be found
hey 
 in certain tendons where they rub over bony 
surface. [FN198] The removal of the nodules would have been necessary if they 
prevented proper drainage of the pus. 
When interpreted literally, the principle that physicians will be liable for tresp
unless they act within strict limits of the patient's consent, or unless they can ava
ass 
il 
themselves of the narrow defense of necessity, [FN199] may *33 lead to absurd 
results, as illustrated by one recent English case [FN200] in which a consultant 
anesthetist was found guilty of an assault (battery) by a suppository. The patient, 
before having four teeth extracted in a dental clinic, was provided with an exp
about the nature and effects of general anesthesia, but not about procedures that m
be undertaken to relieve postoperative pain. She gave her consent to general 
anesthesia verbally and by implication. 
lanation 
ay 
[FN201] While the patient was under the 
general anesthetic, the anesthetist inserted a diclofenac suppository for po
pain. 
stoperative 
[FN202] This was done in the presence of the dental surgeon and two female 
nurses; the patient was informed about the procedure when she regained 
consciousness. The anesthetist was found guilty of an assault and serious profess
misconduct by the professional conduct committee of the General Medical 
Council, 
ional 
[FN203] on the grounds that while carrying out the pain-relieving procedure 
he "inserted the said substance diclofenac suppository without the patient's prior v
consent and thus assaulted her." 
alid 
[FN204] It is arguable that medical contact, which is 
beneficial to the patient but which is unauthorized due to the physician's genuine 
mis attery with take as to the ambit of the patient's consent, ought not to be treated as b
its semi-criminal implications. [FN205] 
The preoccupation with the ambit of the patient's consent predates the 
jurisprudence of self-determination as a principle of tort, and has at its core the old 
contractual notion of consent as "an outcome of consenting minds" of the con
parties. 
tracting 
[FN206] For it was only in 1914 that the idea of a *34 patient's right to self-
determination was expressly introduced into the common law. The case was 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, [FN207] and it concerned a s
who removed a fibroid tumor in circumstances where the patient had consented to a
abdominal examination under anesthesia, but had specifically requested "no 
operation." The issue before the court was not battery, but the defendant hospital's 
liability for torts committed by surgeons while using its facilities. In the course of h
opinion, Judge Benjamin Cardozo made the often quoted observation that: "Eve
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." 
urgeon 
n 
is 
ry 
][FN208  This 
odern jurisprudence-- it is relied upon as the 
bas
l 
 the 
statement has an important place in the m
is for the doctrine that the person's right to refuse medical treatment should 
constitute an absolute personal interest. 
The transposition of a utilitarian philosophical idea regarding political rights and 
commercial freedoms of an individual vis-à-vis the power of a state into the context of 
individual death-choices in the clinical setting, was filtered through the jurisprudentia
theory of rights propounded by Ronald Dworkin in a series of articles published in
1960s and 1970s, the most important of which were collected in 1977 under the title 
Taking Rights Seriously. [FN209] In his analysis of legal standards that guide the
judicial decision-making process, Dworkin made a distinction between policies an
principles whereby "principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are 
propositions that describe goals." 
 
d 
[FN210] Policies set out collective community
goals, such as advancement or protection of political aims, economic efficiency, or 
social welfare. 
 
[FN211] Principles are to be observed because they embody the 
req ct uirements of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality, which respe
or secure some individual or group right. 
Dworkin contended that in civil cases, judicial determinations characteristically 
are, and should be, generated by principle not policy; and that adjudication of what 
legal rights people have should be made in the light of an overall political theory
recognizes moral-political background rights (rights that provide a justification for a 
political decision by the society) as well as those concrete rights against fellow 
citizens already demarcated by law. 
 that 
[FN212] Though not without its critics, [FN213] 
 are 
onsequent 
otion of rights that are exclusively centered on the individual, exerted profound 
IV. F-
e of 
Dworkin's theory of rights, in *35 particular, the notion that individual rights
based on two fundamental values--human dignity and political equality--was in 
harmony with the ideology of the then growing movement of consumerism. 
Dworkin's emphasis on self as the central tenet of societal values, and the c
n
influence upon the legal theory and practice in all common-law countries. 
 
 THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE SANCTITY OF INDIVIDUAL SEL
DETERMINATION AS COMPETING LEGAL VALUES 
Blackstone's principle regarding the absolute right to personal security was 
predicated upon a more comprehensive principle of sanctity of life--in the sens
inviolability--that he considered fundamental to a civilized society. [FN214] Aft
Second World War, this principle was embodied in Article 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1948, it declares that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and sec
of person." In Article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), the principle of sanctity of 
er the 
urity 
life has been interpreted as a right not to be 
dep
5]
rived of life, except on such grounds as are established by law and consistent with 
principles of fundamental justice. 
The principle of the sanctity of life is common to medicine and to law. [FN21  In 
 basis for the prohibition against medically assisted 
suic
al 
ent merit in commanding respect for the worth and dignity 
of t
medicine, this principle forms the
ide in the Hippocratic Oath. In law, the principle of sanctity of life has been 
expressed in the following way: 
Life and the concept of life, represents a deep-rooted value immanent in our 
society. Its preservation is a fundamental humanitarian precept providing an ide
which is not only of inher
he individual but also exemplifies the finer virtues which are the mark of a 
civilised order. [FN216] 
At common law, the principle of the sanctity of human life has private and public 
law aspects. In public law, it has been interpreted by the courts to mean that the
has an interest in the preservation of human life. The *36 protection of life remains a 
primary function of criminal law, 
 state 
[FN217] and underlies the state's interest in 
preventing suicide. The principle of the sanctity of human life also lies at the core of 
the 
 
 
 
 
 The 
e 
detrimental to the patients' well-being in the Millsian sense. The approach of the 
jurisprudential argument against capital punishment. In private law, the principle 
is manifested through the tort of battery. 
The shift in the hierarchy of values that underpin the tort of battery, namely, from
the sanctity of human life, to the sanctity of the human body, to the more recent value
of the sanctity of individual self-determination, has been gradual. Neither the 
Schloendorff case, nor any prior case in which the issue of a patient's right to refuse 
certain medical procedures has been litigated and affirmed by the courts involved
refusal of life-saving treatment. In fact, it appears that until Schloendorff, the courts
still regarded the legal principle of the inviolability of the human body as based 
essentially upon the communitarian interest in the inviolability of human life.
common point in judgments holding that defendant medical practitioners should b
liable for disregarding their patients' instructions, was that such conduct was 
judiciary was in sympathy with the notion that the individual has an unqualified righ
to refuse beneficial interference in matters connected with his or her personal well-
t 
bein lation. 
t. 
t can 
g as a sentient being. This approach excluded death-choices and self-annihi
The issue of refusal of therapeutic treatment, when the consequence of the 
person's choice would bring about death rather than survival, did not arise as a 
medical legal issue until medicine perfected life-saving and life-sustaining treatmen
A procedural difference has emerged as a result of litigation involving the right to 
refuse life-saving or life-sustaining medical treatment. As noted above, the law of 
consent focuses on the presence or absence of a valid consent. In trespass, consen
be vitiated by duress, trickery, withholding of information in bad faith, or 
fraud; [FN218] therefore, the legal analysis is focused on the past conduct of the 
defendant-physician. So long as refusal was considered to be merely the obver
consent for the purposes of establishing whether or not the defendant's conduct sho
be regarded as wrongfu
se of 
uld 
l, cases were litigated only after the allegedly nonconsensual 
con
s 
e 
ief should be guided not only by the 
com
ed 
duct had occurred. 
Once the refusal of medical treatment came to be regarded as a separate right, 
plaintiff-patients began to ask the courts for injunctions and declarations to prevent 
interference with their choice to refuse treatment, including life-saving procedures. 
Hence, the law of refusal concerns proposed conduct or events, and it tends to focu
on the person refusing the life-saving or life-sustaining treatment before it is to b
administered. Moreover, because *37 injunctions and declarations are equitable 
remedies, the courts asked to grant this kind of rel
mon law but also by the principles of equity. 
The seminal cases through which the law of refusal of medical treatment 
developed concerned the refusal of life-saving blood transfusions by Jehovah's 
Witnesses. The first successful blood transfusion for therapeutic purposes was carri
out by James Blundell in 1829 at Guy's Hospital in London. However, it was only 
during the Second World War that blood transfusion became a common practice in 
obstetrics. [FN219] Jehovah's Witnesses are prohibited by the tenets of their religion 
to receive blood transfusions. 
Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. [FN220] is
leading case on this issue. There, a 25-year-old woman, Jesse E. Jones, who lost 
approximately two-thirds of her total blood volume due to a ruptured ulcer, was 
brought to a District of Columbia hospital for emergency care in September of 1963. 
The attending physicians were of the opinion that the patient would die unless
transfusions were administered. The patient and her husband were Jehovah's 
Witnesses and rejected this treatment option. Attorneys for the hospital initially 
sought a judicial order authorizing a series of blood transfusions and overruling the 
woman's right to refuse them. When this application was turned down, the attorneys 
 the 
 blood 
app
le 
er 
ight 
lied to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for an appropriate writ. 
During the hearing at the bedside, Mrs. Jones and her husband indicated that whi
they objected to the blood transfusions on religious grounds, should the court ord
such procedure, they would not feel morally responsible. Justice Skelly Wr
indicated four factors that persuaded him to issue an order authorizing the 
transfusions. First, the patient was the mother of a seven-month-old child. 
Consequently, the state had an interest in preserving Mrs. Jones' life; it also had an 
interest in preventing the abandonment of the child by allowing the mother to 
die. [FN221] Second, Justice Wright indicated that Mrs. Jones' religious beliefs were 
not designed to cause her death: such a result would be only an unfortunate 
repercussion of these beliefs. By coming to the hospital for treatment, the patient 
indicated a desire to live. [FN222] The third factor was a jurisprudential conundrum 
of whether a patient who exercises the right to refuse life-saving treatment is thereby 
placing the hospital and the medical personnel in a position of civil and criminal 
liability for either going ahead with nonconsensual treatment or allowing the patie
to die. The judge did not find clear authority for the patient's right to restrict *38 the 
kind of treatment she could receive to the point that death occurred. 
nt 
[FN223] Justice
Wright suggested that the fourth factor was decisive--the life of the patient hung
balance. Unless he ordered the transfusion "to preserve the status quo," 
 
 in the 
[FN224] death 
would have mooted the entire problem. Rather than not acting, only to learn 
subsequently that the law required the transfusion to be ordered, the judge erred on 
the side of life. [FN225] Each of the four factors discussed by Justice Wright for 
determining the existence of the right to refuse life-saving treatment has had a 
risprudential sequelae that will be analyzed in the context of subsequent 
 
ju
developments. 
A. The Interests of the State in Preserving Life and the "Right to Die" 
The nature of the balance between the interests of the state and the interest of a 
patient in exercising the right of self-determination through refusal of life-saving 
treatment has been considered by United States courts primarily from the perspective 
of constitutional law. [FN226] Most of the early cases concerned patients who refused 
medical treatment forbidden by their religious beliefs, and were argued on the basis of 
con  stitutional implications of the first amendment to the United States Constitution as
well as the common-law right to self-determination. [FN227] 
In his opinion on the denial of rehearing in Application of President & Directors 
of Georgetown College, [FN228] Circuit Judge Warren Burger (as he then wa
on the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 
s) relied 
[FN229] 
who considered that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
endeavored to protect "Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and 
their sensations." It thus "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be left 
alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
man." [FN230] In a remarkable exercise of mind-reading, Judge Burger determined 
that 
*39 [n]othing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individua
possessed these rights only as to sensib
l 
le beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, 
or w , ell-founded sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish
unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical 
treatment even at great risk. [FN231] 
Generally, in the 1970s, cases that involved legal issues associated with the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients had at their core
existence of the constitutional right to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining treatme
The incompetent patient's "right" to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or 
withdrawn was initially interpreted by United States courts as being based on t
common-law right to informed consent, "or on both the common-law right an
constitutional privacy right." 
 
 the 
nt. 
he 
d a 
[FN232] Although the United States Constitution does 
not explicitly refer to the right to personal privacy, the courts have found "the 
unwritten constitutional right of privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights." [FN233] 
Subsequently, in the Cruzan case, [FN234] the United States Supreme Court 
considered that the "right to die" through refusal of life-sustaining procedures--if it 
exists [FN235]--is based not on the right of personal privacy but rather on the "liberty 
interest" delineated in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with
 
out due process of 
law t 
ncompetent 
." The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the fourteenth amendmen
prohibited the state from requiring clear and convincing evidence of the i
person's desire to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. 
Hence, the judicial process employed in these cases entailed balancing state 
interests against the constitutional rights of the individual. In the case of 
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, [FN236] which involve
the application to sanction the withholding of chemotherapy from a profoundly 
retarded 67-year-old leukemia patient, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
ruled that four state interests were implicated: (1) the preservation of human 
life; 
d 
[FN237] (2) the protection of innocent third parties who *40 may be adversely 
affected by the death of the person seeking to exercise his or her "right to die"; (3) the 
prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medi
profession, including the right of
cal 
 the physician to administer medical treatment to the 
best of his or her judgment. [FN238] In Saikewicz, the court recognized the interest in
preservation of human life as paramount and noted that it was greatest when the 
affliction was curable. 
 
[FN239] 
In the United States, the issue of the right to refuse life-saving treatment tend
be grounded as much in the public constitutional law as in the private law of trespass 
to person. 
s to 
[FN240] In Australia and the United Kingdom, neither the interests of the 
state, as identified by the Supreme Court of the United States in Saikewicz and 
Cruzan, including the interest in preservation of life, nor the "liberty interests" of the 
individual to refuse life-saving treatment have a constitutional foundation. They are 
grounded in the common law of battery. [FN241] 
Building on Judge Cardozo's statement that "every human being of adult years a
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body," modern
common-law jurisprudence has elevated the principle of inviolability of negative 
individual decisions regarding one's body above that of the general principle of 
sanctity of life. 
nd 
 
the 
[FN242] This is because the principle of inviolability of the human 
bod
thro
y that is seen merely as an expression of the individual interest in personal self-
determination, involves, by implication, the right to a death-choice manifested 
ugh refusal of life-saving treatment. 
In 1986, the California Court of Appeal, in Bouvia v. Superior Court, [FN243] 
affirmed this doctrine by interpreting the statement of Judge Cardozo as meaning t
a person of adult years and in sound mind 
hat 
has the right, in the exercise of control 
over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to medical treatment. It 
follows that such a patient has the right to refuse any medical treatment even that 
which may save or prolong her life. [FN244] 
In England, the person's legal right to make a death-choice was succinctly expressed 
by Lord Goff of Chieveley in the case of Airedale NHS Trust v. *41 Bland, [FN245] 
rinciple of the sanctity of human life must yield to the 
rinciple of self-determination." [FN246]
where he stated that "the p
p  Thus, the locus of the modern tort of battery 
d existence. 
 
isional 
has shifted from the sanctity of life to the sanctity of personal choices in relation to 
one's body an
B. Religious Conviction and the Issue of "Sound Mind" as a Criterion of Dec
Competence 
In the Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, [FN247] 
Justice Wright's decision took into account the patient's views and religious 
convictions. [FN248] Justice Wright noted that Mrs. Jones was a committed Jehovah
Witness--a person whose religious beliefs compelled her to refuse life-saving blood 
transfusions--but who did not want to die. Her refusal was neither unexpected nor 
spontaneous. She was an adult who knew about, considered, and accepted the 
consequences of adhering to the tenets of her religion well before the circumstances
that necessitated the blood transfusions arose. As such, her decision fulfilled the
criteria for valid consent as defined by Henry Ballow--it was "an act of reason" a
"deliberation" by way of balancing "the good and evil on either side." 
's 
 
 three 
nd 
[FN249] She
also appeared to fulfill the medical requirements of competence, which include
capacity for understanding and communication, the capacity for reasoning and 
deliberation, and a stable set of
 
 the 
 values or a conception of what is bad and 
good. [FN250] In law, these capacities are subsumed under the legal criterion of 
"sound mind." The law uses the concept of sound mind to determine decision-making 
capacity--whether or not the person is, or was, capable of making a decision that 
ought to be binding on others. 
The phrase "sound mind" is not a medical term. The expression denotes a stri
legal concept of competence, which traditionally refers solely to intellectual capac
The law presumes an adult person to be competent unless the person is shown to be 
unable to carry out certain mental tasks. Competence, in the sense of cognitiv
ctly 
ity. 
e ability 
to m
 duly 
 
ake a contract, to plead, to make a will, to vote in elections or to consent to 
treatment, is a legal concept and can be determined only by a judge or other
constituted legal authority, though a psychiatrist or a psychologist may be *42 called
in to assist in determining the standard of the person's competence. [FN251] 
Although there is no specific case-law definition of "sound mind" for the purposes 
of the civil law of trespass, this concept has been negatively defined under 
testamentary law. In the case of Banks v. Goodfellow, [FN252] a legally compe
person was described by Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ in the following way: 
[T]o the due exercise of a power . . . involving moral responsibility, the posse
of the intellectual and moral faculties common to our nature should be insisted on as 
an indispensable condition. It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a 
testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the 
extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and 
appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with th
tent 
ssion 
e view to the latter 
 
ch, 
object, that no disorder of his mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of 
right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties--that no insane delusion shall
influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it whi
if the mind had been sound, would not have been made. [FN253] 
In stressing the importance of the dispositor's "natural faculties"--in the sense of his or 
her cognitive capacity--as an "indispensable" element of "sound mind," [FN254] 
Cockburn CJ was echoing the view of John Stuart Mill when he insisted that the 
doctrine of individual liberty was "meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties." [FN255] 
The language used in the judgment is open to very broad interpretation. It is 
possible to infer from it that when determining the decision-making competence of 
any individual, the court may take into consideration any psychiatric condition tha
may lead to an affective disorder, 
t 
[FN256] making him or her unable to understand 
the moral difference between right and wrong, lead to serious cognitive impairmen
or produce a psychotic state. However, in Banks, the Court of Queen's Bench chose to 
t, 
interpret the criteria of "sound mind" very narrowly. In this case, the testator was 
convinced that he was pursued and molested by devils or evil spirits. Neverth
was capable of looking after his financial affairs, and had given clear and rational 
instructions for his will, which left the greater part of his fortune to the niece *43
had looked after him. The court held that the will was valid. For, although the testator
was suffering from an insane del
eless, he 
 who 
 
usion, it did not influence his testamentary 
dispositions, because according to Cockburn CJ: " T hough mental power may be 
reduced below the ordinary standard, yet if there be sufficient intelligence to 
understand and appreciate the testamentary act in its different bearings, the power to 
make a will remains." [FN257] 
Thus, the juridical test for the purposes of civil law [FN258] of a person's mental 
competence--whether or not he or she is of sound mind--is based on the cognitive 
criteria that measure the person's intellectual capacity to know, including the capacity
to understand, weigh, and consider the nature of the proposed course
 
 of 
action. [FN259] For the purposes of decisional competence, the presumption 
mind may be negated when the "disorder of the mind" (1) poisons the person's 
affections; (2) perverts his or her sense of right; (3) prevents the exercise of the
of sound 
 
per
0]
son's natural faculties; or (4) where insane delusion influences the person's will. 
The test of legal competence as set out in Banks v. Goodfellow has been 
criticized, particularly its reference to the standard of "insane delusion." [FN26  Yet, 
f then existing medical knowledge, his Lordship's 
rson's 
even this phrase has been judicially re-defined in terms of cognitive capacity: 
Although made in the light o
statement does not appear to differ, in substance, from the latter-day psychiatrist's test 
of what is a "delusion," that is, that it is not capable of rational explanation or 
amenable to reason, and that it is not explicable by reference to the subject pe
education and culture. [FN261] 
In psychiatry, delusions, together with overvalued ideas, are classified under the broad
category of i
 
mpairment of mental function as abnormalities of thought content. 
Del
e 
 
usions can either be primary or secondary, they may be *44 persecutory, 
grandiose, and alike, or may involve delusions of reference. In patients with 
schizophrenia, specific delusions of thought broadcasting, and delusions of influenc
may occur. 
The definition of "sound mind" for the purposes of testamentary law must be 
considered in its context, and in particular, the principle that "the absolute and 
uncontrolled power of testamentary disposition conceded by law is founded on the 
assumption that a rational will is a better disposition than any that can be made by the
law itself." [FN262] Nevertheless, the common law in general tends to focus upo
mechanism of the decision-making process rather than the decision itself. Once the 
procedural criteria as set by the law are satisfied, the actual decision--no matter how
irrational and detrimental to the person's well-being--has to be respected. The reason 
provided by the common law for justifying the line drawn between the decision-
making process and the decision is guided by the respect for the di
n the 
 
gnitary interests of 
an individual and his or her choices. [FN263] It would appear that such a complete 
separation of the decision-making process from the actual decision has its provenan
in the dualistic theory of the mind and body dichotomy postulated by the 17th cen
French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes. 
ce 
tury 
[FN264] 
Descartes identified mind, which he defined as a "res cogitans" (thinking thi
cognition, with the immaterial soul. The experiences of cognition, perception, and
emotion were considered by Descartes as the soul's immaterial reactions to some 
material movement in the blood or spirits of the bodily machine. The feelings, 
ng) or 
 
whether of anger, grief, or joy, were not the cause but the consequence of prior 
material bodily actions and functions. [FN265] For the purposes of metaphysical 
inquiry, therefore, all issues related to mind and soul could be separated from the
physical body and regarded as the domain of theologians and philosophers. The body
perceived as a complex mechanism with interacting solid and fluid parts, was the 
province of study by physiologists and physicians. The Cartesian separation of mind 
and body was challenged from a philosophical point of view already in the 17th 
century by Baruch Spinoza, who, in the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy 
 
, 
[FN266] 
and the posthumously published treatise *45 Ethics, [FN267] replaced the Cartesian
theory of dualism with the concept of "psychological parallelism" according to which
mind and body are inseparable. Mind and body form two aspects of the same entity-- 
the living organism--which experiences its physiological processes psychologically 
 
 
as 
affe es 
f 
8]
cts and thoughts. John Locke also repudiated the Cartesian interpretation of r
cogitans, and the refusal by Descartes to endorse the old philosophical Latin maxim 
"nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu" (there is nothing in the realm o
intellect (understanding) that did not originate from sensory perceptions). [FN26  
Toward the end of the 18th century in his Critique of Pure Reason [FN269] 
Immanuel Kant explored the nature of reason in the sense of cognition and the 
of the "knowing" process. 
limits 
[FN270] Having accepted that all knowledge begins with 
sensory experience, Kant analyzed how the "sensuous impressions"-- intuitions 
(Anschauung) antecedent to perception--are converted into an experience and then 
organized by intellect into knowledge. Kant pointed out that "although all our 
knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from 
experience." [FN271] Sensory impressions were for Kant occasions for the activation 
in t
 
 
he mind of the rules of understanding-- identified with reason--which through the 
process of recognition and evaluation as well as categorization, helped the mind to
conceptualize the original undifferentiated mass of sensory data into an "organized
experience and the unity of consciousness." [FN272] 
In 1858, Rudolf Virchow, in his book Cellular Pathology Based on Physi
and Pathological Histology, 
ological 
[FN273] demonstrated that the causes of the disease 
process lay in the disturbance of cellular pathology, and not in "invisible ethere
substances" as postulated by the medical followers of Descartes. Accordingly, 
Virchow suggested that disease could be explained best through changes in 
physiology and biochemistry of the organism, whereas illness was the subjective 
experience of suffering. 
al 
[FN274] This approach to human homeostasis, which 
inv ns, has 
 
nse, is 
olves the physiological, sensory, and cognitive as well as affective functio
been widely accepted by modern medicine. Nevertheless, it seems that the legacy of
Cartesian separation of *46 mind and body still survives in the courts' analyses of the 
decision-making process and the decision itself. 
It is arguable that the notion of the "sound mind" as legal standard based 
exclusively on the criterion of cognitive ability of the patient to understand what is 
being said to him or her, and to make an informed decision in an intellectual se
not the most suitable way of ascertaining that person's mental state in the context of a 
refusal of life-saving treatment, particularly when the decision is made during a 
medical crisis. [FN275] The English case of Re T [FN276] illustrates pressures that 
may impair the decision-making capacity of an adult patient in an emergency 
situation. Thirty-year-old Ms. T was injured in a car accident when she was 34 week
pregnant. Though not a Jehovah's Witness herself, Ms. T was brought up by her 
divorced mother, a fervent member of the sect. The injured woman was admitted to a
hospital, where, following diagnosis of pneumonia, she had to be given high doses of 
s 
 
antibiotics, oxygen, and pethidine (a narcotic analgesic). After she went into labor, 
Ms. T was transferred by an ambulance to the labor ward. By that time, Ms. T had
two private conversations with her mother, and subsequently informed the midwife 
and the physician about her opposition to blood transfusions. The obstetrician assu
 had 
red 
her se to 
ent to 
 that a cesarean section did not usually necessitate a transfusion and, in respon
her inquiry, said that other, less effective, procedures also were available. As the 
physician was leaving, the midwife produced a hospital form of refusal of cons
blood transfusions, which Ms. T signed and the midwife countersigned. [FN277] 
Following an emergency cesarean operation the child was stillborn. Ms. T's 
condition seriously deteriorated and she was transferred to an intensive care unit. The
medical opinion was that Ms. T needed a blood transfusion. She was put on a 
ventilator and paralyzing medications were administered. Ms. T remained sedated, 
though in critical condition, while her father, supported by the father of the baby, 
applied to the court for a declaration that it would not be unlawful for the ho
administer a blood transfusion in the absence of her consent. Judge Ward grante
declaration, and the appeal from the Official Solicitor as guardian ad litem for Ms. T 
was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 
 
spital to 
d the 
[FN278] The court said that at the *47 time 
she signed the hospital refusal of blood transfusion form, the patient was in 
considerable pain, she was suffering contractions in the first stage of labor, her 
con
 
e and 
k and 
cts 
 
 than one who is rested, free from pain and cheerful. Second, the 
rela
sciousness was clouded by repeated doses of pethidine, and she was acting under 
the influence of her mother. In relation to the last factor, outside influences, that may 
compromise the voluntariness of the patient's decision to refuse life-saving treatment, 
Master of the Rolls, who delivered the leading judgment, pointed out that 
[t]he real question in each case is: "Does the patient really mean what he says or is
he merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advic
persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer thin
decide for himself?" When considering the effect of outside influences, two aspe
can be of crucial importance. First, the strength of the will of the patient. One who is
very tired, in pain or depressed will be much less able to resist having his will 
overborne
tionship of the "persuader" to the patient may be of crucial importance. The 
influence of parents on their children or of one spouse on the other can be, but is by 
no means necessarily, much stronger than would be the case in other 
relationships. [FN279] 
There are a number of reasons why the legal criteria involving the decision-
mak
o 
, which precludes from consideration such subjective factors 
as p
ing capacity of seriously medically impaired persons, including those who refuse 
life-saving treatment, should be different from the traditional approach, which has 
been developed in relation to determining the validity of consent amongst those wh
are physically and emotionally well. 
The common-law jurisprudence has adopted the third principle of utilitarianism--
that of strict impartiality
ersonal condition, feelings, the effects of kin-ship, and religious or nationality 
affiliations--as the touchstone against which all legal standards are traditionally 
measured. [FN280] Lord Mustill in Aire-dale NHS Trust v. Bland expressed this rule 
in the following terms: 
If the patient is capable of making a decision on whether to permit treatment and 
dec
ven 
ides not to permit it his choice must be obeyed, even if on any objective view it is 
contrary to his best interests. A doctor has no right to proceed in the face of objection, 
even if it is plain to all, including the patient, that adverse consequences and e
death will or may ensure. [FN281] 
Lord Mustill's analysis may be applicable without qualification to Mrs. Jone
as a member of a particular religious congregation, had made a *48 considered choic
to follow the precepts of her creed long before the actual circumstances that 
necessitated blood transfusion eventuated. 
s who, 
e 
[FN282] However, it is questionable 
whether such an unqualified rule should be equally applicable to death-choices 
through refusal of life-saving treatment made by the systemically ill, the febrile, the 
depressed, those who suffer from psychoses and other mental disorders. The ability of 
psy
e 
nt's 
ay 
chiatry to understand human decision-making process has come a long way since 
Ballow's analysis of the nature of consent and the criteria for determining "sound 
mind" as applied in Banks v. Goodfellow. The time has come for reappraisal of thes
legal concepts in the light of modern medicine. 
Medicine, and in particular psychiatry, recognizes that such factors as the patie
personality, affective disorder, medications, external pressures and the setting, m
impair clinical competency, leading to a refusal of treatment. Disease is frequently 
accompanied by stress and/or pain, productive of depression, that may impair the 
patient's ability to function competently in processing and understanding medical 
information and making treatment decisions. [FN283] The prevalence of severe 
depression among patients who are medically ill has been estimated as being betw
10% and 20%, with a prevalence rate of twice that among geriatric patients and th
who are severely medically ill. 
een 
ose 
[FN284] Interviews in the form of psychological or 
psychiatric autopsy with surviving relatives of suicides have found that a very large 
proportion (between 50% and 100%) of the deceased had suffered a psychiatric 
disorder, particularly depressive illness, in the period immediately preceding the 
suicide. [FN285] Susan Sorenson observed that "the elderly, the emotionally stressed, 
and persons who lack stable connections with others appear to be the most frequent 
victims of suicide." [FN286] 
The law presumes that every adult individual is cognitively competent to make a
medical decisions until proven otherwise. 
ll 
[FN287] The case of In re *49 AC [FN288] 
is an example of the application of this legal rule. In this case, a 27-year-old patient,
who was 25 weeks pregnant, and who had suffered from a variety of cancers since the 
age of 13, was admitted to the high-risk unit of the obstetrics department at Georg
Washington University Hospital. The patient, Angela Carder, was diagnosed as b
 
e 
eing 
in a
ting, 
ill 
 terminal stage of an inoperative tumor nearly filling her right lung. At the time 
the fetus reached 26 1/2 weeks of gestation, its chances of survival were deteriora
due to the seriousness of Ms. Carder's physical condition. When asked if she st
wanted the baby, her answer appeared to be "I don't know; I guess so." [FN289] 
The hospital petitioned for an emergency hearing to be held at the hospital before
a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The hospital sought a 
declaration that the cesarean section could be carried out if the patient refused 
permission. The operation was not intended to save or prolong the mother's life, but to
provide a slim possibility of the 50% to 60% chance of survival for the fetus. A
time of the hearing, the judge found that due to heavy sedation and intubation, it was 
not clear what the patient's wishes were. Nevertheless, he granted the declaration. The 
baby was born alive, but died within three hours. The patient died of cancer two da
later. 
 
 
t the 
ys 
[FN290] The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the primary 
decision. [FN291] The majority stated that "in virtually all cases," a pregnant wo
has the right to decide what is to be done on behalf of herself and the fetus. 
man 
[FN292] It 
is th  is 
d 
e duty of the court to determine the patient's competency, and, if the patient
found incompetent or otherwise unable to give an informed consent to the propose
therapy, the judge must ascertain her wishes through the process of substituted 
judgment based on all the evidence. 
Medical studies published during the last decade have noted that cognitive 
disorders are a frequent complication of cancer. [FN293] These studies show that 
patients with advanced terminal cancer often experience repeated episodes of 
cognitive failure [FN294] as recorded on the Mini-Mental State 
Questionnaire, [FN295] *50 a screening test used for cognitive assessment. [FN296] 
A study using the Abbreviated Mental Test Score (AMTS) and a semistructured 
application of modified DSM III-R criteria for major depressive illness [FN297] 
found that 34% out of 87 terminally ill cancer patients displayed significant cognitive 
impairment. The principal determinants of cognitive impairment were age and 
proximity to death. 
Cognitive failure in patients with advanced cancer may be caused by medications, 
sepsis, brain metastases, liver failure, renal failure, hypercalcemia, or hypoglycemia, 
amongst other possible precipitants. However, in the study by Bruera and 
colleagues, [FN298] no cause of cognitive failure could be established in 56% of 
cancer patients. [FN299] The available data suggested that cognitive failure was 
extremely frequent in patients with advanced cancer approximately 16 days before 
death. [FN300] Therefore, it has been postulated that cognitive failure may be part of 
an organic brain syndrome that represents the final stage in many dying 
patients. [FN301] 
There are only two findings that are open to a tribunal that utilizes the legal 
standard of "sound mind" --competence and incompetence. Yet, there are many le
of cognitive impairment. In an acute organic brain syndrome (delirium), the pa
develops a global impairment of cognitive functioning, which may be mild and hen
easy to overlook. In particular, mild delirium may not be recognized by the clinician if
it is associated with only a slight degree of "clouding of consciousness" (impair
state of consciousness, which in severe delirium progresses to stupor or coma).
vels 
tient 
ce 
 
ed 
 Such 
cog e, nitive failure usually manifests itself as disorientation in relation to time, plac
and person. Its particular manifestations also include inability to sequence recent 
events, odd and inconsistent behavior, irritability, and suspiciousness. A well-
developed syndrome may include such features as impaired*51 concentration and 
memory, together with reduced awareness of and responsiveness to the 
environment. [FN302] The speech of a person suffering from acute cognitive failure
may be characterized by restriction of content, repetition, and perseveration. 
 
[FN303] 
Perhaps the most important aspects of acute cognitive failure that need to be 
considered when a patient is making vital life and death decisions in a clinical setting 
are es. 
t 
elop 
the changes that occur with respect to thought content and organic mood chang
These changes may involve impoverishment of intellectual function manifesting itself 
as concrete thinking--the inability to abstract the sense of what is said from its literal 
meaning--as well as emotional liability, at times involving a sense of bewildermen
that may verge on fear or terror. In extreme cases of delirium, the patient may dev
delusions, as well as manifesting cognitive impairment and clouding of 
consciousness. 
In a recent study, Grisso and Appelbaum [FN304] have investigated decision-
making capacity among three groups of hospitalized patients: those with diagnoses of
schizophrenia, major depression and ischemic heart disease (angina pectoris), and
equal cohort of community subjects matched on
 
 an 
 age, race, gender, education, and 
occupation. Each subject was tested for the ability to (1) express a choice; (2) to 
"understand the treatment discourse" in the sense of understanding information 
relevant to the decision about treatment; (3) to appreciate the significance of his or her
own situation of the information disclosed about the illness and possible treatments 
(perceptions of the disorder, nonacknowledgment of disorder); and (4) to manipulate 
the information rationally (or reason about it) in a manner that allows for making
comparisons and weighing opinions. 
 
 
[FN305] 
The study found that whereas only a few subjects were unable to express a 
there were significant differences between the performance of the groups in relation
the three remaining measures. In particular, it is of concern that a substantial number 
of subjects who performed adequately on one measure revealed impaired performa
on another. Thus, of the 72% of subjects with schizo
choice, 
 to 
nce 
phrenia who performed 
adequately on the understanding measure, 24.1% had impaired performance on 
appreciation and 14.8% on reasoning. [FN306] When, in accordance with the lega
standard for competency, all measures are compounded, 52% of subjects with 
schizophrenia would be considered as having impaired capacity to make treatment 
decisions. Comparable figures for the other groups were *52 23.9% for patients with 
major depression, 12.2% for the group with angina pectoris, and 4% for the three 
community comparison groups combined. 
l 
[FN307] 
The law needs to be more attuned to the reality of medical illness as understood 
by modern medicine, and to take into account the subtle distinctions in cognitive 
competency. Moreover, while separating the actual decision from the cognition-
oriented decision-making process may have some merit, in cases where the choice o
life-style is in issue, such separation is inappropriate when applied to cases where the
choice is between life and death. The legal definition of "sound mind" would no
exclude a person with a paranoid disorder, who insists that he or she does not suffe
from the given condition, and is thus quite eager to declare that no treatment should 
be underta
f 
 
t 
r 
ken. Yet, as the Grisso and Appelbaum study illustrates, it is common in 
paranoid conditions for the person's cognitive functioning to remain intact. Such a 
person can appear to have a thorough understanding of the risks and benefits of the 
treatment, or of alternative treatments, without actually being able to interpret these 
data as relevant in the context of his or her own situation. [FN308] It has been 
claimed that persons suffering from paranoid conditions, [FN309] or from serious 
affective disorders, [FN310] "constitute the largest population of treatment 
refusers." [FN311] 
In the case of Re T, [FN312] Lord Donaldson MR emphasized that the patient's 
right to choose death should be held paramount only after "a very careful examin
of whether, and if so the way in which" 
ation 
[FN313] the patient was exercising that 
"In case of doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of preservation of life for if 
the individual is to override the public interest, he must do so in clear terms." 
right. 
4][FN31  
This 
*53 
ms 
does not have that capacity, it is the duty of the doctors to treat him in whatever way 
He expressed the rules pertaining to the patient's capacity to make legally binding 
choices concerning medical treatment in the following way: 
(1) Prima facie every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or not he 
will accept medical treatment, even if a refusal may risk permanent injury to his 
health or even lead to premature death. Furthermore, it matters not whether the 
reasons for the refusal were rational or irrational, unknown or even non-existent. 
is so, notwithstanding the very strong public interest in preserving the life and 
health of all citizens. However, the presumption of capacity to decide, which ste
from the fact that the patient is an adult, is rebuttable. (2) An adult patient may be 
deprived of his capacity to decide by long-term mental incapacity . . . (3) If an adult 
patient did not have the capacity to decide at the time of the purported refusal and still 
they consider, in the exercise of clinical judgment, to be in his best interests. (4) 
Doctors faced with a refusal of consent have to give very careful and detailed 
con
 
ls 
sideration to what was the patient's capacity to decide at the time when the 
decision was made. It may not be a case of capacity or no capacity. It may be a case 
of reduced capacity. What matters is whether at that time the patient's capacity was
reduced below the level needed in the case of a refusal of that importance, for refusa
can vary in importance. Some may involve a risk to life or of irreparable damage to 
health. Others may not. [FN315] 
These rules apparently were applied by Thorpe J in the 1994 case of Re C (Adult: 
Refusal of Treatment), [FN316] when the High Court of England was aske
an injunction restraining the hospital from carrying out an amputation without the 
patient's express written consent. The case involved a 68-year-old man, Mr. C, wh
was an emigrant to England of Jamaican origin. His passage was paid
d to grant 
o 
 for by a woman 
who er 
d 
ed to 
con  
thetic. Mr. 
 
d 
 left him five years after his arrival. A year later he accosted her at work and aft
an altercation stabbed her. Mr. C was sentenced to a seven-year term of 
imprisonment, but on being diagnosed as suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia, was transferred to a Broadmoor secure hospital. Over the years, he ha
been treated with medications and ECT. In 1994, Mr. C knocked his left foot in a 
shower and some three weeks later developed gangrene in that foot. 
At a general hospital, the consultant surgeon told Mr. C that unless his leg was 
amputated below the knee, he would die within a very short time. His prognosis was 
that at best, Mr. C had a 15% chance of survival without amputation. Mr. C refus
sent to the amputation. However, he was persuaded to agree to a treatment with
antibiotics, and then a debridement of the dead tissue under a general anes
C said he would rather die with two feet than live with one. He expressed grandiose
delusions of an international career in medicine during the course of which he ha
never lost a patient. He affirmed his complete confidence in his ability to survive his 
present trials aided by God, the "good doctors," and the "good nurses." [FN317] 
Mr. C was seen by three psychiatrists, including Dr. Eastman, a lecturer and a 
senior consultant in psychiatry at St. George hospital, who explained that 
schizophrenia is an all-pervasive illness. Features present in Mr. C's case included 
grandiose and persecutory delusions as well as an incongruity of affect--Mr. C's 
words did not match the emotions which he *54 displayed. According to Dr. Eas
although Mr. C appeared to understand the information about the possible treatments 
and their outcomes, he did not believe it, and so was unable to weigh the info
provided to him, that is, to determine the risks and benefits involved in relation to hi
own condition. Dr. Eastman considered that Mr. C did not believe in the imminence
of his death because of his mental illness. Dr. Eastman indicated that the ultimate 
conclusion should be reached "by weighing in the scales the prese
tman, 
rmation 
s 
 
rvation of life 
aga  inst the autonomy of the patient. If the patient's capacity to decide is unimpaired,
autonomy weighs heavier, but the further capacity is reduced, the lighter the 
autonomy weighs." [FN318] The other two psychiatrists agreed with Dr. Eastman's 
assessment. However, Mr. Rutter, the consultant vascular surgeon, believed in "
sanctity of the individual choice, even if it be wrong" 
the 
[FN319] and argued that the 
amputation should not be performed against the patient's wishes. 
Thorpe J of the Family Division of the High Court of England, agreed with Mr. 
Rut  leg 
t 
clusion, Thorpe J used the legal 
ter, and granted an injunction to prevent surgeons from operating on Mr. C's
without his consent. The judge declared that the presumption in favor of Mr. C's righ
of self-determination had not been displaced, and his choice not to undergo the 
amputation had to be respected. In coming to his con
crit
 
erion of "sound mind," which disregards the patient's affective function, including 
the presence of major functional disorders such as schizophrenia and depression. 
There are also some psychopathological conditions in which the individual 
manifests illness behavior considered to be "abnormal," that is, out of keeping with
the objective evidence of disease. [FN320] A person's illness behavior may be 
characterized as "abnormal" in cases where there is 
the persistence of an inappropriate or maladaptive mode of perceiving, evalua
or acting in relation to one's own state of health, despite the fact that a doctor (or other
appropriate social agent) has offered an accurate and reasonably lucid explanation of 
the nature of the illness and the appropriate course of management to be followed,
based on a thorough examination of all parameters of functioning, and taking into 
account the individual's age, educational and sociocultural background. 
ting 
 
 
1][FN32  
Abnormal illness behavior can take several forms of illness denial. [FN322] 
Illness denial may be motivated by a conscious desire to obtain employment
and shame, by fear of the stigma and discrimination associated with *55 psychiatri
symptomatology, or by hope to avoid feared therapies such as chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy. Sometimes illness denial may have unconscious motivation, su
neurotic noncompliance following myocardi
, by guilt 
c 
ch as 
al infarction or refusal to accept 
psychological diagnosis or treatment in the presence of neurotic illness, personality 
disorder, or drug dependency syndromes. Persons suffering from psychotic 
depression, manic states, and schizophrenic disorders often present with denial of 
illness, including somatic pathology. Patients with neuropsychiatric syndromes, such 
as Korsakoff's psychosis caused by alcohol abuse, also tend to present with 
confabulatory reactions to illness. [FN323] 
Subtle, or even overt, pressures by family, and sometimes by clinical personnel, 
may impair the affective function of a patient and morbidly distort his or her view o
life leading to refusal of life-saving treatment. 
f 
[FN324] Finally, on a sociocu
level, it has been noted that the fundamental shift of
ltural 
 traditional values from solicitude 
and ly of 
e 
 benevolence to patient autonomy and self-fulfilment has had the effect not on
eroding community support for expensive long-term care, but also has affected th
self-esteem of the afflicted persons. [FN325] In this context, one may ponder whethe
the advocacy of an unqualified right to refuse life-saving treatment is prompte
much by belief in an inalienable right to self-determination as by other, less 
benevolent, personal and communitarian interests. 
The traditional state interest in preservation of life based upon the cost to the 
community of supporting the family of a person who dies as a result of refusing 
medical treatment has lost its cogency in the reality of health care economics in th
1990s. 
r 
d as 
e 
[FN326] For instance, in the United States, approximately 30% of the 
Medicare budget is spent on medical treatment during the last year of its benefic
lives. 
iaries' 
[FN327] The cost of hospital care for an adult patient in a persistent vegetat
state for the first three months has been estimated at approximately $149,200, and the 
costs of long-term care at a nursing facility tend to range from $126,000 to $180,00
per year. Annual cos
ive 
0 
t of home care for children in a persistent vegetative state is 
esti 28]mated at $129,000 for the first year, and $97,000 for subsequent years. [FN3  
While the *56 cost of care for the chronically ill is very high, [FN329] so is the 
expense involved in the provision of certain drugs, [FN330] and such life-saving 
treatment as heart, lung, and liver transplantations. [FN331] The resurgence of h
medical care has been accompanied by financial and emotional strains on the care 
providers. 
ome 
[FN332] 
Legislative efforts to facilitate patient refusal of treatment, by way of such 
instruments as living wills, advance directives, and their variations [FN333] is aimed 
at furthering the interest in self-determination. However, there is also an expectation 
that costs associated with end-of-life medical care will thereby be substantially 
contained. [FN334] The doctrine of the "human capital," which is one of the most 
influential determinants of the nature and the level of funding of the health care 
system by governments, measures the strictly economic costs of disease. [FN335] The
aim of this method of evaluating the value of life is to "remind the society that the 
burdens of disease are borne not only by the sick but by all those who would bene
from the contribution to society that would be made if the patient were whole
again," 
 
fit 
 
[FN336] or, alternatively, *57 savings that accrue to the health care system 
whenever a patient decides to refuse expensive medical treatment, or requests th
or her now "unproductive" life be terminated. 
at his 
[FN337] It is true that in the context of 
end-of-life management, provision of high quality palliative care is much more 
important to the welfare of patients and their families than the employment of life-
sus
e 
 
taining "heroic medicine," when its aim merely is to prolong the biological 
existence of hopelessly ill patients at the cost of their increased suffering. This chang
in emphasis, however, should not be motivated by the economic concern to save
scarce and expensive medical resources. Rather, provision of palliative care should be 
grounded in the deontological respect for human life regardless of a person's sex, age, 
creed, or physical or mental status, coupled with acknowledgment that death is an 
integral and inevitable part of life. [FN338] 
Studies have demonstrated that patients, particularly those with serious injuries, 
such as spinal cord injury, tend to suffer from depression in the early stages of their 
treatment, which often manifests itself in an express wish to die. [FN339] This 
con r. It 
s 
e 
gal 
dition presumably would be compounded when such a patient is also a prisone
is imperative that in a civilized society, patients who are prisoners should enjoy right
to self-determination with respect to medical treatment that are no less valuable than 
those enjoyed by other patients. However, the determination as to whether these 
patients are truly competent to make life and death choices should not be made on th
basis of normative principles, in disregard of their actual affective state and their le
status. 
In the United States, in the case of Thor v. Superior Court of Solano 
County, [FN340] the Supreme Court of California quoted John Stuart Mill's stateme
that " over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is *58 
sovereign" 
nt 
[FN341] when it decided that Howard Andrews, a prisoner serving a 15-
year-to-life sentence for murder, had the right to reject medical treatment, even if
meant that he would die. Andrews became quadriplegic as a result of a jump or a fall
from a cell tier at California's Folsom Prison in 1991. At the medical facility at 
Vacaville, staff psychiatrists who examined Andrews found him "depressed about 
quadriplegic condition but mentally competent to understand and appreciat
circumstances." 
 it 
 
his 
e his 
[FN342] In its brief as an amicus curiae, the California Medical 
Association argued that the possible inadequacy of medical and other services in 
prison may compromise the voluntary and rational nature of an inmate's decision. 
Consequently, when a prisoner refuses life-saving medical treatment, there should 
a mandatory judicial hearing to assess the impact of the prison environment on the 
prisoner's decision-making capacity. In rejecting this sugge
be 
stion, the court took 
jud  meet icial notice of the presumption that the "medical facilities within prison walls
the same professional standards as those without," [FN343] and of the "constitutional 
and administrative protections guaranteeing an inmate a proper treatment." [FN344] 
The court ruled that a proposal for a mandatory judicial hearing "tends to denigrate 
the principle of personal autonomy, substituting a species of legal paternalism for the 
edical paternalism the concept of informed consent seeks to eschew," and declared 
[FN345]
m
that "' rationality' is for the patient to determine."  
 the 
C. T
 
y 
The modern law has been so zealous to secure the individual a right to self-
determination that it has lost sight of the wider humanitarian considerations and 
compassionate principles that play an important part in protecting the vulnerable,
depressed, and the disabled. 
 
he Nature of Physician-Patient Relationship 
Roscoe Pound pointed out that the legal tradition of common law displays a
certain jurisprudential dichotomy. While it focuses upon an individual and zealousl
guards individual rights, it also tends to impose duties and liabilities upon those 
standing in certain relations as members of a class rather than upon 
individuals. [FN346] 
The third factor considered by Justice Skelly Wright in Application of President & 
Directors of Georgetown College was the issue of competing autonomies--the 
ind
ng 
ividual autonomy of the patient and the professional autonomy of the attending 
physicians. The modern jurisprudence has yet to find a clear answer to the problem 
presented by patients who voluntarily *59 come to the hospital but who, once there, 
choose to exercise their right to refuse life-saving treatment, thereby placing the 
hospital and medical personnel in a position of potential legal liability for either goi
ahead with nonconsensual treatment or for allowing the patient to die. [FN347] 
The physician-patient relationship as presented in Corpus Hippocratic
in Percival's Medical Ethics, has undergone profound changes in the past 200 
years. 
um, or even 
[FN348] In the Hippocratic tradition, the responsibility for making clinica
treatment decisions was delegated to physicians in the belief that their clinical 
training, a degree of emotional detachment, and the ethical ideals expressed in the
Hippocratic Oath, 
l 
 
[FN349] would best qualify them to accurately diagnose and 
suggest treatment options that were in the best interests of each particular 
patient. [FN350] Nevertheless, with regard to the issue of consent, the traditiona
Hippocratic approach has been modified in accordance with modern social and 
cultural expectations. Physicians have come to realize that in the necessarily unequal 
physician-patient relationship, where the medical practitioner has expertise from 
which the patient hopes to benefit, seeking a consensual approach based upon an 
adequate disclosure of relevant i
l 
nformation goes some way toward ameliorating the 
ethi  
e 
d 
cal dynamics of the relationship. Disclosure of treatment options and discussion of
their respective advantages and disadvantages promotes the principle of non-
maleficence (discussed below) without derogating from the clinical autonomy of th
treating physician. This modified approach pre-supposes that, insofar as it is 
practicable, the role and duty of the physician is to work together with the patient 
toward the therapeutic goals they have arrived at in consultation. 
In law, the relationship between patient and physician is today generally regarde
as at least partly grounded in the law of contract. Thus, in the English case of Sidaway 
v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital [FN351] while considering a patient's right to be informed, Lord Templema
observed that "the relationship between doctor and patient is contractual in origin, the 
doctor performing services in consideration for fees payable by the patient." This 
notion, though not entirely accurate, presupposes that for a fee, the patient gets th
medical practitioner to "service" his or her health. Although unarticulated, the concept
n 
e 
 
of human health as a form of commodity, coupled with the 19th century's principle of 
freedom of contract, has been as much responsible for affording *60 jurisprudent
legitimacy to the doctrine that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body," 
ial 
 
[FN352] as was th
based principle of bodily integrity. Contractual approach, centered as it is on the 
doctrine of consenting minds, can operate only in circumstances where the wishes of 
the consenting parties are known. Jurisprudential problems created by the underlying
assumption about th
e tort-
 
e contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship are 
evid
 
ent in the inability of the law to develop a unified conceptual framework to deal 
with the issue of withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from
incompetent persons whose wishes in relation to medical treatment are 
unknown. [FN353] The more jurisprudentially satisfactory resolution of this issu
be found within the covenantal model of the physician-patient relationship, based on
the best interests standard. 
Perhaps due to the perception of health as a commodity, some courts in the
States, Canada, and New Zealand have started to characterize the rights and 
obligations of medical practitioners and their patients as fiduciary. 
e can 
 
 United 
[FN354] For 
instance, in the case of Mclnerny v. MacDonald [FN355] the Supreme Court of 
Canada identified the relationship between the physician and the patient with "that 
which exists in equity between a parent and his child, a man and his wife, an attorney
and his client, a confessor and his penitent, and a guardian and his ward" and 
classified it as "as a fiduciary or trust relationship." 
 
[FN356] The court determined 
that the fiduciary nature of the relationship obligated the physician "to act with
good faith and loyalty and to hold information received from or about a patient 
confidence." 
 utmost 
in 
[FN357] The characterization of the physician-patient relationship as 
fiduciary does not accord with the principles of equity. The fiduciary relationship of 
trust and confidence arises where one party to the relationship assumes the obliga
to act in th
tion 
e other's proprietary interests. [FN358] The adjective "confidential" in a 
trus
 
ting relationship is used to indicate the attribute of "trust and confidence." 
However, the term "confidential" is *61 used in a different legal sense when it 
designates a relationship that is formed whenever one party imparts to another private 
or secret information in reliance upon the express or implied acceptance by the party
in the position of a confidant that the communication is for a restricted 
purpose. [FN359] 
Indeed, in Sidaway v. Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital, [FN360] Dunn LJ, in 
the Eng es 
inv uty 
whi
lish Court of Appeal, said that the fiduciary rule "has been confined to cas
olving disposition of property, and has never been applied to the nature of the d
ch lies upon a doctor. . . . " [FN361] On appeal, Lord Scarman also rejected 
ion that the relationship between patient and physician is of a fiduciary charact
 would entitle the patient to relief in the event of a
the 
not er 
that  breach of fiduciary duty by the 
medical practitioner. [FN362] Lord Scarman stated that 
there is no comparison to be made between the relationship of doctor and 
patient with that of solicitor and client, trustee and cestui qui trust or the other 
relationships treated in equity as of a fiduciary character. Nevertheless, the 
relationship of doctor and patient is a very special one, the patient putting his 
health and his life in the doctor's hands. [FN363] 
Following a thorough examination of the subject in Australia, the majority of the 
rt of Appeal of the New South Wales Supreme Court Cou [FN364] approved the 
reasoning in the judgment of Lord Scarman and rejected the labeling of the physician-
patient relationship as fiduciary. Justice Mahoney pointed out that although 
the law requires a doctor to act with the utmost good faith and loyalty to his 
patient and to hold information given to him by the patient in confidence. . . it is 
wrong to infer from such obligations that a more general relationship-- trust
fiduciary--exists. . . . A doctor is plainly not a trustee vis-a-vis his 
patient. 
ee or 
[FN365] 
Unless the physician holds in trust for the patient identifiable items of *62 proper
use of such terms as "fiduciary" or "trustee" does not represent accurate statement of 
the law and consequently "confuses rather than assists proper legal analysis of 
relationships and of what, in law, results from them." 
ty, 
[FN366] To sum up, a physici
patient relationship has some fiducial characteristics, yet, the essential element o
trusteeship ov
an 
f a 
er another person's property rights is missing. [FN367] Therefore, 
lthough the relationship between physician and patient is classified as "confidential" 
 do not transform it into a "fiduciary" or 
"tru
a
and one of dependence, these features alone
st relationship" as those terms are used in the law of equity. [FN368] It is more 
appropriate to use covenantal terminology when referring to a physician patient 
relationship. 
 
D. Consent and Clinical Decision-Making 
Agreement is an essential element of a covenantal relationship. Lord Donaldson 
MR originally defined the role of consent to medical treatment in the following way: 
"Co he nsent by itself creates no obligation to treat. It is merely a key which unlocks t
door." [FN369] In a subsequent judgment he qualified this statement when he said: 
"On reflection I regret my use in Re R of the keyholder analogy, because keys can 
lock as well as unlock. I now prefer the analogy of a legal 'flak jacket' which protects 
the doctor from claims by the litigious." [FN370] 
Thus, in the case of In re J (A Minor), [FN371] the Court of Appeal said that 
neither a patient nor a court has any statutory or common-law right to insist that a 
particular treatment or intensive care be provided to the patient when such thera
not medically indicated. 
py is 
[FN372] The case involved an 18-month-old child, J, who at 
the age of one month sustained serious head injuries that rendered him profoundly 
mentally and physically handicapped, suffering from microcephaly, cerebral palsy, 
cortical blindness, and severe epilepsy. He was considered unlikely to develop gr
beyond his present state and had an uncertain but shortened life expectancy. J's 
intermittent convulsive attacks required resuscitative treatment in the hospital, and in 
December of *63 1991,
eatly 
 the consultant pediatrician considered that it was medically 
inap
etermine whether artificial ventilation and other life-saving treatment 
sho
dgment 
 
iring the 
, 
ith 
ing that other practitioners who are not 
call e 
propriate to use mechanical ventilation procedures for any future resuscitation. 
Asked to d
uld be administered to J, the Court of Appeal held that medical practitioners 
should not be required to treat patients in a manner contrary to their clinical ju
and professional duty. 
In the leading judgment, Lord Donaldson MR presented the following analysis of
this issue: 
I have to say that I cannot at present conceive of any circumstances in which this 
would be other than an abuse of power as directly or indirectly requ
practitioner to act contrary to the fundamental duty which he owes to the patient. This
subject to obtaining any necessary consent, is to treat the patient in accordance w
his own best clinical judgment, notwithstand
ed upon to treat the patient may have formed a quite different judgment or that th
court, acting on expert evidence, may disagree with him. [FN373] 
Quoting from an earlier decision, [FN374] the judge explained the legal relationsh
between physicians and those who have the right to make decisions on behalf of 
incompetent patients in the following way: 
ip 
ds 
use to 
No one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child--neither court, parents 
nor doctors. There are checks and balances. The doctors can recommend treatment A 
in preference to treatment B. They can also refuse to adopt treatment C on the groun
that it is medically contra-indicated or for some reason is a treatment which they 
could not conscientiously administer. The court or parents for their part can ref
consent to treatment A or B or both, but cannot insist upon treatment C. [FN375] 
Leggatt LJ noted that the Court of Appeal has not given to physicians any right 
they did not previously have by ruling that the medical staff should be free, subj
consent not being withdrawn, to treat patients in accordance with their best clinical 
judgment. The decision "has merely declined to deprive them [physicians] of a pow
which it is for them alone to exercise." 
ect to 
er 
[FN376] Although the judgments, and 
therefore the rules, were made with reference to the powers of guardians and courts 
mak
f 
ng 
 having to resolve a 
con
le 
ing treatment decisions for incompetent patients, there is no reason why the same 
principle of professional autonomy should not apply within a physician-patient 
relationship when the patient is fully competent. The law sets a limit to the patient's 
right of self-determination by constraining the patient's capacity to *64 request the 
kind of treatment that clinical personnel regard as either medically contraindicated or 
contrary to their conscience. 
Clinical decision-making in relation to treatment options involves consideration o
the patient's psychological and physical needs, as well as technical and moral aspects 
which, at times, may be difficult to reconcile. A request by the patient that life-savi
treatment be withheld or withdrawn, may involve the physician in
flict between two ethical obligations. The physician's first ethical obligation is to 
act in accordance with the principle of non-maleficence. This fundamental princip
of the Hippocratic tradition in medicine [FN377] focuses as much on the physician's 
engagement in the provision of benefit as on the avoidance of harm: "Declare the pa
diagnose the present, foretell the f
st, 
uture; practice these acts. As to disease, make a 
habit of two things--to help, or at least to do no harm." [FN378] 
The classical principle of non-maleficence has been understood as tending tow
circumspection rather than being action-oriented. 
ard 
[FN379] It guides the medical 
practitioner toward rendering help by avoiding conduct that may permit detriment or 
cause harm to the patient's best interests. The more modern, bioethical principle o
beneficience has bee
f 
n defined as 
se 
an obligation to help others further their important and legitimate interests by 
preventing and removing harms; no less important is the obligation to weigh and 
balance possible goods against the possible harms of an action. This principle of 
beneficence potentially demands more than the principle of non-maleficence becau
it requires positive steps to help others, not merely the omission of harmcausing 
activities. [FN380] 
Despite their superficial similarity, these two principles are philosophically and
ethically separate, and may come into conflict with one another. 
 
[FN381] According
to the Hippocratic tradition, in cases of conflict, the moral duty of non-maleficen
other things being equal, has priority. This may require an attempt by the medic
practitioner to protect the patient from the harmful consequences of his or her choice 
when such a choice appears to be due to a m
 
ce, 
al 
ajor affective disorder, cognitive 
impairment, or abnormal illness behavior. At the same time, in cases where there 
exists a conflict between the *65 patient and the treating physician, with respect to 
preference in treatment options, the latter has to be conscious of his or her ow
psychological responses to a difficult situation and careful not to designate the 
patient's refusal of treatment as abnormal simply because such refusal is at odds 
n 
with 
the physician's views on the issue. [FN382] 
The second, though equally important, obligation of a medical practitioner is to 
respect the right of patients to make decisions about their own bodies and lives, and to 
ensure that the medical treatment accords with their wishes. When a legally 
competent patient appears to make a choice about treatment that is patently contrary 
to his or her well-being, these two obligations will come into conflict. [FN383] 
Whenever a physician determines that the patient's choice is adversely affected 
irrational considerations, be they conscious or unconscious, the physician will a
to persuade the patient to change or modify that choice but, ultimately, once a leg
competent patient has decided to refuse life-saving treatment, legally, the patient's 
decision must be obeyed. There is a curious anomaly in the legal rules that relate 
the right of self-determination in the context of the physician-patient relationship. On 
the one hand, a medical practitioner has the right to refuse to administer medically 
contraindicated treatment requested by a competent patient on the ground that 
submission to such a request would be incompatible with the maintenance of the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession. On the other hand, the same physicia
to respect the patient's right to die through refusal of medical therapy because of 
respect for the patient's right of self-determination. In both cases, 
by 
ttempt 
ally 
to 
n has 
no cause of action in 
attery will arise so long as the treating physician does nothing and leaves the patient 
othing" 
mea
n 
 
b
free of uninvited physical contact. Nevertheless, in the first instance, "doing n
ns noncompliance with the patient's wishes, in as much as the dignitary interests 
protected by law do not extend to the patient having a right to compel medical 
personnel to treat him or her in a particular way. In the second instance the physicia
stays within the law by complying with the patient's wish to die. 
 
E. The Balance of Life and Death and the Refusal of Life-Saving Treatment 
The fourth factor, regarded as decisive by Justice Skelly Wright in Application of
President & Directors of Georgetown College, was the fact that Mrs. Jones' life "hung 
in the balance." [FN384] The present common law *66 regards the right to choose 
whether or not to undergo life-saving treatment as a manifestation of the individual's 
inalienable right to self-determination, which has to be respected regardless of the
consequences of the decision. 
 
[FN385] Should the applicability of the absolute rule 
exte  
 
nd to cases where the refusal of life-saving treatment by a pregnant woman will
inevitably result in her own death as well as the death of an otherwise viable fetus? In
the case of Re T, Lord Donaldson MR noted, in obiter dictum, that an absolute right 
of competent adults to choose whether to consent or to refuse life-saving treatment 
may be qualified in a case "in which the choice may lead to the death of a viable 
fetus." [FN386] However, the Master of the Rolls left this question open. 
Sir Stephen Brown P was probably referring to this "open question" when, in 
1992 English case of Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), 
a 
[FN387] he consi
application by a health authority for a declaration to authorize surgeons and staff of
the hospital to carry out an emergency cesarean section operation upon Mrs. S, who
was the mother of two young children. She was admitted to the hospital with ruptured 
membranes and in spontaneous labor, beyond the expected date of birth. By th
the matter came before court, the mother had continued in labor for six days,
situation was extremely serious, and the condition of the fetus was rapidly 
deteriorating. The position of the fetus was that of "transverse lie," with the elbow 
dered an 
 
 
e time 
 her 
projecting through the cervix and the head on the right side of the pelvis. Allowing 
natural labor to continue was certain to cause rupture of the uterus and the consequent 
death of the mother and the fetus. Mrs. S, a born-again Christian, refused the 
operation on religious grounds. Nevertheless, Stephen Brown P granted the 
declaration authorizing the cesarean section. In the judgment, which was completed
within the space of an hour, 
 
[FN388] Stephen Brown P emphasized that the situati
was one of "life and death," and the issue had to be determined within "minutes rather 
than hours." 
on 
[FN389] Indeed, the decision came too late for the child, but by acting on 
the declaration, the physicians *67 were able to save Mrs. S's life. [FN390] Believi
that "God was acting through the agency of the gynaecologist," Mrs. S soon 
reconciled herself with the situation and decided against appealing to the Court of 
Appeal. 
ng 
[FN391] Nevertheless, Sir Stephen Brown's decision was greeted with at 
times emotive [FN392] criticism by lawyers who regarded it as a "major intrusion i
the rights of women." 
nto 
[FN393] 
The harsh criticism meted out to Stephen Brown P was well grounded in stric
legal doctrine, but revealed little in the way of humane understanding. Can a society 
that calls itself civilized, countenance a situation where a yo
t 
ung woman, carrying a 
viab
 
m acting 
e 
of 
 
 
e 
survival. Therefore, the legal criteria for 
eva d to 
 on 
te defense to criminal 
tres
le fetus, dies a cruel, but easily preventable, death from a ruptured uterus? Had 
the judge refused to grant the declaration, the medical personnel attending Mrs. S,
qualified and able to prevent such disaster, would have been constrained fro
by a principle of respect for her autonomy. In Re S, Stephen Brown P refused to 
dogmatically apply an abstract legal doctrine that would have rendered his decision 
legally unassailable, yet morally and socially indefensible. 
Philosophical notions of personal autonomy, which form the foundations of th
jurisprudential principles of self-determination were formulated in the context 
survival, not annihilation. From a consequentialist point of view, there is a 
fundamental difference between the outcome of a decision to consent to a life-saving
treatment and a decision to refuse such an intervention. Unlike those who make the
death choice, persons who consent to life-saving treatment at the very least preserv
the status quo, and also, by remaining alive, retain an opportunity to change their 
mind at a later date. The recent evolution of the law has taken the principle of 
autonomy to its ultimate conclusion--beyond 
luating the person's capacity to make autonomous choices need to be adapte
take account of that extension. The consequentialist position based upon a simple 
dichotomy between life and death may be too inflexible to adequately address the 
variety of circumstances and factors that motivate individual death choices. At the 
same time, the difference between the consequences of consent to and refusal of life-
saving treatment cannot be entirely ignored. 
*68 The law has traditionally adopted a consequentialist approach when it 
considered communitarian interests, such as the consequences of violent behavior
public order, and disallowed consent to constitute an absolu
pass to person. Reiterating the principle established by Lord Coleridge CJ in 1692 
in the case of Matthew v. Ollerton, [FN394] Hawkins J stated in the 1882 case of R. 
v. Coney [FN395] that "it is not in the power of any man to give an effectual consen
to that which amounts to, or has a direct tendency to create, a breach of peace; so as
bar a criminal prosecution." Since the 17th century, the legal efficacy of consent 
would not extend to the risk of death in duelling. 
t 
 to 
[FN396] 
The common-law rule that consent is no defense to unlawful wounding except in 
cases of surgery, tattoos, contact sports, and "horse-play" [FN397] was codified in the 
United Kingdom in the Offences Against the Person Act. [FN398] Justification for 
this rule was provided by Lord Lane CJ in 1981 when he declared: "It is not in the 
public interest that people should try to cause or should cause each other bodily harm 
for no good reason." [FN399] Lord Lane added that the principle of "public interest" 
was not intended to "cast doubt upon the accepted legality of . . . reasonable su
interference." 
rgical 
[FN400] The case concerned two youths who, following a quarrel, 
agreed to have a fist fight, which resulted in a bloody nose and bruises to the face of
one of them. 
The rule was affirmed by the majority of the House of Lords in the case of R. v. 
Brown 
 
[FN401] in relation to a group of men who appeared [FN402] to have 
consensually engaged in extreme forms of sadomasochistic practices. [FN403] The 
House of Lords held that the prosecution does not have to prove lack of consent to 
infliction of actual harm in the course of sadomasochistic activity. [FN404] When th
consent to bodily interference is provided voluntarily by a *69 competent person 
has balanced the ris
e 
who 
ks and benefits involved, the law distinguishes between operative 
and the  inoperative consent taking into consideration the following two factors: (1) 
nature of the harm--whether or not the harm consented to is of minor nature, rather 
than manifesting itself as an actual bodily harm; [FN405] and (2) the reason for th
harm--whether or not the harm was occasioned for a "good reason" or in "public 
interest." 
e 
[FN406] 
In cases where the interference cannot be justified on the grounds of "good 
reas r 
ases." [FN407]
on" or "public interest" and the consensual conduct occasions actual, or serious, o
grievous bodily harm, the victim's consent will be regarded in law as being of no 
consequence. In R. v. Brown, Lord Templeman rejected the contention that "every 
person has the right to deal with his body as he ple  Lord Mustill, in a 
 
 to ensure a proper balance between 
the 
dissenting judgment, paraphrased John Stuart Mill's words when he said: 
The state should interfere with the rights of an individual to live his or her life as
he or she may choose no more than is necessary
special interests of the individual and the general interests of the individuals who 
together comprise the populace at large. [FN408] 
Lord Mustill drew the line on the rights of individuals to choose how they may
beyond consent to sadomasochistic practices, but noted that the efficacy of consent 
does not extend to consensual killing. 
 live 
[FN409] 
The common law's approach to consent is clearly consequential. Its legal ef
depends entirely on the characterization of the purpose and the outcome of the 
consensual conduct in question. Consent to interference with one's body as an 
expression of the right to self-determination may be deemed inoperative when it is
"other-oriented," for instance, in the cases of sexual enslavement or sadomasochi
activities. 
ficacy 
 
stic 
[FN410] However, the right to self-determination also may be "self-
oriented," involving actions directed at one's body, for instance, self-mutilation. He
again, the approach of the *70 law is consequential--such acts of self-mutilation as 
ears, nose, and genital piercing tend to be regarded as legally acceptable, but self-
mutilation that has the effect of endangering the person's productive capacity or 
health-- cutting off one's hand--may be deemed outside the choices to which an 
individual has a legal right. A great majority of modern mental health statutes th
regulate involuntary commitment stipulate that the certified p
re 
at 
erson's conduct, which 
as the result of an impaired mental condition, constituted a danger to himself or 
al validity of consent--whether regarding self, or others--is not 
con
w
herself. If the leg
sidered to be an absolute value but is determined in accordance with the sliding 
scale of harm, then one may ask why refusal of treatment should be deemed of 
absolute value irrespective of the harm thereby occasioned? 
 
CONCLUSION 
The orientation of the present law of trespass to person has moved too far away
from general communitarian considerations implied by the principle that the best way
to uphold public peace and social harmony is by effectively safeguarding person
integrity and dignitary interests of all individuals. The notion of an unalienable righ
to self-determination in matters relating to personal well-being had its origins in the 
law of contract, which developed under the influence of philosophical theories of 
social contract and utilitarianism. Transposed into the law of torts, the absolute right 
to refuse life-saving treatment gives rise to an inference that it 
 
 
al 
t 
is at least in part 
info The 
d 
and 
g a suicidal refusal of treatment from merely an unreasonable one? At 
whi f 
ular 
ng 
e 
ho 
 
utions, 
otions of "sound 
ind" are modified to incorporate the modern medical understanding of affective 
ng 
rmed by the economic interest in reducing public health care expenditure. 
preoccupation with absolute values is a relatively novel development in common law. 
Traditionally, the common law tended to be concerned with the individual rights and 
obligations within the "give and take" principles of community interests rather than 
with such abstract notions as absolute truth or absolute rights. 
Conceptually, the legal right to self-determination is, undoubtedly, a very 
significant and essential element of modern jurisprudence--people, in general, shoul
be able to exercise control over their bodies in relation to undertaking or cessation of 
any invasive medical regimen. Nonetheless, there are a number of profound moral 
human questions that sit uneasily with the declaratory statements of an ideologically 
pure notion of personal autonomy. For instance, what are the legal criteria for 
distinguishin
ch point should an unreasonable refusal of treatment be treated as an indication o
the absence of "sound mind" and the patient considered to be legally incapable of 
making a decision about treatment choices? Who should decide whether the partic
refusal of life-saving treatment amounts to a passive suicide, and whether it is 
reasonable? 
*71 A narrow, cognition-oriented legal standard for valid consent to life-savi
medical treatment is sufficient when the consequence of that consent means survival, 
with the patient still retaining an option to change his or her mind. It is altogether 
insufficient, however, in cases where the refusal of treatment means death, which 
allows for no second chances. 
There is a danger than an ideological purity of the right to refuse life-saving 
treatment as an expression of the right to individual self-determination may disguis
other considerations. It is much less expensive to uphold the right to die of those w
suffer from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, the clinically depressed, the disabled, the
systemically ill, and those in pain than to care for them at home, in mental instit
in prisons, hospitals, and hospices. Unless and until traditional n
m
capacity into the legal standard for valid consent to or valid refusal of life-savi
medical treatment, the law will accord greater protection to the hale, the hearty, and 
the emotionally stable than to the diseased, the mentally ill, and those who are 
emotionally stressed either through pain or loneliness, or both. 
 
[FNa]. Senior Lecturer in Law, Deakin University, School of Law, Burwood, 
Australia. Address correspondence to Dr. Mendelson at Deakin University, Schoo
Law, 22
D
University, Melbourne, Australia and Mr. Ian Freckelton, Barrister of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria and New South Wales, Senior Lecturer at Faculty of Law, Monash 
l of 
1 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Australia 3125. The author wishes to thank 
r. George Mendelson, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Medicine, Monash 
University, for their comments and helpful suggestions in the preparation of this 
article. 
 
[FN1]. E. Coke, 6 Rep. 41. Throughout this article the phrase "common law" is used 
tomary law, which in the 
te medieval period displaced the local and the baronial law in England, and to 
ts 
in its jurisprudential sense to denote the single national cus
la
distinguish this system of law from the civil law of continental Europe, and the Sco
law. 
 
[FN2]. P. YOUNG, THE LAW OF CONSENT 3 (1986). 
 
[FN3]. F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL G
438 (2d ed. 1990). 
 
UIDE 
[FN4]. Mendelson, Medico-Legal Aspects of the "Right to Die" Legislation in 
Australia, 19 MELBOURNE U.L. REV. 112 (1993); A. MEISEL, THE RIGHT
DIE 94-95 (1989); Jennett, Treatment of Critical Illness in the Elderly, 24 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (Sept./Oct. 1994). 
 
 TO 
[FN5]. "Affect" refers to the immediate emotional experience. Subjective affective 
sensations such as pleasure, displeasure, irritation, as reported by a patient, are 
equivale
sa
flexible mental state over a longer period of time. In depression or schizophrenia, the
affective sensations are often shallow, inadequate, or flattened. Ketai, Affect, Mood, 
E
(1975). 
 
nt to symptoms; the observed mood and affective display (anger, joy, 
dness, hurt) serve as objective signs. "Mood" refers to a more sustained and less 
 
motion and Feeling: Semantic Considerations, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1215 
[FN6]. The patient
o
 
's "choice is, in reality, meaningless unless it is made on the basis 
f relevant information and advice." Rogers v. Whitaker, 175 C.L.R. 479, 490 (1992). 
N7][F . Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
N8]
 
[F . Id. at 786. 
N9]
 
[F . Id. at 793. 
N10]
 
[F . Reibl v. Hughes, 114 D.L.R.3d 1 (1980). 
 
[FN11]. Id. at 10-11. 
 
[FN12]. Rogers, 175 C.L.R. at 490. 
N13]
 
[F . In rejecting the American doctrine of informed consent in negligence, the 
f Australia followed the majority of the House of Lords in the case of 
idaway v. Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] A. C. 871. 
High Court o
S
 
[FN14]. Rogers, 175 C.L.R. at 490. 
 
[FN15]. Id. 
 
[FN16]. Although "ass
in
 
ault" is a separate tort with its own set of elements, it is often, 
correctly, used as an appellation for the tort of battery. 
[FN17]. J. FLEM
 
ING, THE LAW OF TORTS 24 (8th ed. 1992). 
[FN18]. Id. at 17, 25. 
 
[FN19]. This principle is also applicable to the torts of assault and false 
N20]
imprisonment. 
 
[F . Beauchamp, The Four-Principles' Approach, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH 
CARE ETHICS 6 (R. Gillon ed. 1994). 
 
[FN21]. K. MITCHELL & T. LOVAT, BIOETHICS FOR ME
H
 
DICAL AND 
EALTH PROFESSIONALS 25 (1991). 
[FN22]. Mental Health Act (Vic.) of 1986 §§ 12, 13, 73, & 85. 
 
[FN23]. A plea of nec
 
essity may provide lawful justification. 
[FN24]. "The incision made by the surgeon's scalpel need not be and probably is m
unlikely to be hostile, but unless a defence of justification is established it must in my 
judgment fall within a definition of a trespass to person." T. v. T., [1988] 2 W.L.R. 
189, 203 (Wood, J.). 
 
ost 
[FN25]. Secretary, D
(M
parents or the family court should have the power to consent to a sterilization of their 
profoundly
 
ep't of Health & Community Servs. (NT) v. JWB and SMB 
arion's Case), 175 C.L.R. 218, 309 (1992). The case involved the issue of whether 
 intellectually impaired daughter. 
[FN26]. Id. at 233. 
 
[FN27]. In re W (A M
7
 
inor, Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction), [1992] 3 W.L.R. 
58, 765. 
N28][F . 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
N29]
 
[F . Id. at 1225. 
 
[FN30]. Malette v. Shulman, 67 D.L.R.4th 321, 328 (1990). 
 
[FN31]. [1993] A.C. 789, 864. 
 
[FN32]. Duels of honor--private combat in the form of consensual revenge for the 
perceived injury to the participants' honor and reputation--probably were the best 
known vestiges of "faida." 
 
[FN33]. A "writ" w
G
as an order issued by the court in the sovereign's name under the 
reat Seal, addressed to the sheriff of the county in which the cause of action arose, 
or where the defendant resided, commanding the sheriff to cause the party co
of to appear in the King's Court on a certain
w
specified remedy. 
 
mplained 
 day to answer the complaint. Every writ 
as founded on a principle of law that gave the plaintiff the legal right to seek a 
[FN34]. R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD 
RELATION 27 (1988). 
 
[FN35]. There was also an older form of private action--Appeal of Mayhem--an 
f Mayhem was different from the Appeal of Felony whereby a party--a 
idow or an heir--who had an interest in the person killed prosecuted an accusation of 
W LAW DICTIONARY (1756). 
accusation of maiming, that was akin to action in Trespass for recovery of damages. 
The Appeal o
w
murder either by writ or bill. G. JACOB, NE
 
[FN36]. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV
315 (1894). 
 
. 
N37][F . J. FLEMING, supra note 17, at 17. 
 
[FN38]. The principle that by
to
unsuccessfully--invoked as a basis for liability in Stanley v. Powell, [1891] 1 Q.B. 86. 
 
 being able to obtain compensation under the law of 
rts, the plaintiff was thereby induced to forgo the right to take revenge was--
N39][F . The spelling of the Latin word "iniuria" as "injuria" is the accepted common-
N40]
law form of medieval Latin. 
 
[F . Ingman, A History of the Defence of Volenti non Fit Injuria, 26 JURIDICAL 
REV. 1 (1981). 
 
[FN41]. H. BRACT
p
 
ON, DE LEGIBUS AT CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 
robably was written between 1240 and 1256. Id. at 2. 
[FN42]. 
 
[1984] Q.B. 524 (CA). 
[FN43]. Id. at 557. 
 
[FN44]. H. LUNTZ & A. HAMBLY, TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY 681 
(1992). 
 
[FN45]. In medieval times, England was divided into areas known as circuits. 
Nottingham was one such circuit, and it would be visited four times a year by the 
court to decide all cases that ha
o
 
d arisen since the last sitting of the court. Each session 
f sitting was referred to as an assize. 
[FN46]. The Surgeon's Case Nottingham Eyre [AD 1329] Lincoln's Inn, Hale MS 1
(1), f58; Br. Mus. Egerton MS. 2811, f. 218; A. KIRAFLY, A SOURCE BOOK 
ENGLISH LAW 184 (1957). 
 
37 
OF 
[FN47]. The writ of covenant
in
--to secure enforcement of an agreement--was 
applicable because the loss of the eye did not result from a breach of agreement 
through its nonperformance; it probably was due to the
p
 
 careless or incompetent 
erformance of the agreed procedure. 
N48][F . 6 Mod. 149 (1704). 
 
[FN49]. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHA
 
N ch. XIV (1904). 
[FN50]. Matthew v. Ollerton, [1692]
 
 Comb. 218, 90 Eng. Rep. 438. 
[FN51]. 364 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. 1976). The husband was charged with the offense
of "atrocious assault and battery." 
 
 
[FN52]. Brown, 364 A.2d at 31-32. 
 
[FN53]. Legal duels such as judicial combat, or ordeal by battle, introduced by t
Norman
sh
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 419 (1992). 
 
he 
s constituted exception to the rule that a consensual premeditated killing 
ould constitute murder. Horder, The Duel and the English Law of Homicide, 12 
[FN54]. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 127a & b 
(1628). 
 
[FN55]. Mansell v. Griffin, [1908] 1 K.B. 947. 
 
[FN56]. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPON
tr
MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE 100-01 (1991). 
 
NESIAN WAR bk. 2, ch. 4. (R. Warner 
ans. 1964). For further discussion, see O. PATTERSON, FREEDOM IN THE 
[FN57]. Referring to the Roman concept of personal freedom the "libertas," Cicero 
called it the "sweetest of all possessions." 
 
[FN58]. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 5.27 (P. 
ifferent context, that "the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as 
 
Laslett ed. 1970). It was Sir Edward Coke who stated, admittedly in a somewhat 
d
well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose." Semayne's Case, 5
Co. Rep. 91a (1604), [1558-1774] All E.R. 62, 63. 
 
[FN59]. 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF E
 
NGLISH LAW 658 (1938). 
[FN60]. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765) 
(Lord Camden, C.J.). This decision was reaffirmed
1
Colet v. The Queen, 119 D.L.R.3d 521, 526 (1981). 
 
 in Australia in Plenty v. Dillon, 
71 C.L.R. 635, 639 (1991) (Mason, C.J., Brennan & Toohey, J.J.), and in Canada in 
N61][F . 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
N62]
120 (facsimile of the 1st ed. of 1765-1769, 1979). 
 
[F . "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every 
individual." Id. vol. 1, at 125, 129-30 & vol. 3, at 119-20. 
 
[FN63]. "In purity and in holiness I will guard my life and my art." L. EDELSTEIN
ANCIENT MEDICINE 6 (1987). 
 
, 
[FN64]. Corpus Hip
a
by Hippocrates (460 BCE). However, the Corpus as a whole is the work of a large
number
B
Mann trans. 1983). 
 
pocraticum consists of about 60 treatises, the collection of 
phorisms, the Oath, and the Canon. Some of the treatises and aphorisms were written 
 
 of medical writers of ancient Greece that was compiled between 430 and 300 
CE, with even later interpolations. HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS (J. Chadwick & W. 
[FN65]. On the Ph
ti
 
ysician, Precepts, and On Decorum were written in Hellenistic 
mes. 
N66][F . L. EDELSTEIN, supra note 63, at 328-29. 
 
[FN67]. Id. at 59. 
 
[FN68]. S. NULAND, DOCTORS: THE BIO
 
GRAPHY OF MEDICINE 24 (1989). 
[FN69]. Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath, in LEGACIES IN ETHICS AND 
MEDICINE 12 (C. Burns ed. 1977). 
 
[FN70]. L. EDELSTEIN, supra note 63 at 6. 
 
[FN71]. Id. at 17. The Pythagorean approach toward sanctity of life was akin to that 
hich regards the human body not as property of an individual person, 
ut that of the Creator. Individuals are merely custodians or trustees of their bodies, 
 
of Judaism, w
b
the ownership of which rests with the Creator. In Judaism, every person is charged
with a positive duty to preserve health and life. 
 
[FN72]. Id. 
 
[FN73]. In classical times (5th-3rd century B.C.E.), the Gr
m
Hellenistic period (3rd-1st century B.C.E.), the political authorities in Thebes and 
Massalia (modern Marseilles) supplied a free dosage of hemlock on application. 
Y
Assisted Suicide, 39 McGILL L. J. 657, 686, 689 (1994). 
 
eek City-State of Ceos 
andated that people over the age of 60 end their life by drinking hemlock. In the 
oung, Cross-Cultural Historical Case Against Planned Self-Willed Death and 
[FN74]. A. ROGERS, A STUDENT'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 148 (1915), 
quoted in D. KLEIN, A HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 116 (1
 
970). 
N75][F . Several medical sects flourished during the Graeco-Roman period, amongst 
 
 Wear ed. 1994). 
them were the Oulidai at Elea, the Methodists, the Asclepiadeans of Bithynia, the 
"Sicilian School," and others. Nutton, Healers in the Medical Market Place: Towards
a Social History of Graeco-Roman Medicine, in MEDICINE IN SOCIETY: 
HISTORICAL ESSAYS 15 (A.
 
[FN76]. In Roman times, Stoicism often was seen as a spiritual alternative to the 
national religion. Philosophers were attached to many Roman families in the role of 
tu
often be present at a deathbed. 
 
tors and moral counselors. Thus, a philosopher, along with the physician, would 
[FN77]. On the Physician (CMG I: 10, 21; 14, 1
n
 
), quoted in L. EDELSTEIN, supra 
ote 63, at 99. 
[FN78]. Nutton, supra note 75, at 49. 
 
[FN79]. L. EDELSTEIN, supra note 63, at 98. 
 
[FN80]. 1 THE APHORISMS OF HIPPOCRAT
L
See also HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS, supra not
 
ES i (Author's rendition) (trans. into 
atin and English in T. COAR, THE CLASSICS OF MEDICINE LIBRARY (1982)). 
e 64, at 206. 
[FN81]. Hippocratic Oath reflects the beliefs of the Pythagoreans in the spiritual 
kinship between the medical teacher and pupil. 
 
[FN82]. L. EDELSTEIN, supra note 63, at 329. 
 
[FN83]. Galen (130-201 CE), in an essay entitled That the Best Physic
P
then was fused with Aristotelianism and Stoicism. L. EDELSTEIN, supra note 63, at 
335. 
 
ian Is Also a 
hilosopher, insisted that a true physician must be an adherent of Platonism, which by 
N84][F . 1 HIPPOCRATES: PRECEPTS 319 (W. Jones trans. 1923). 
 
[FN85]. Kibre, Hippocratic Writings in the Middle Ages, 18 BULL. HISTOR
371 (1945); MacKinney, Medical Ethics and Etiquette in th
P
 
Y MED. 
e Early Middle Ages: The 
ersistence of Hippocratic Ideals, in LEGACIES, supra note 69, at 173. 
N86][F . The Hippocratic Canon was translated into Hebrew by Nathan Hameati of 
9. Etziony, The Hebrew-Aramaic Element in Vesalius' Tabulae 
natomicae Sex, 18 BULL. HISTORY MED. 413 (1945). 
N87]
Rome in 127
A
 
[F . Kristeller, The School of Salerno, 17 BULL. HISTORY MED. 138 (1945). 
 
[FN88]. Id. 
 
[FN89]. Justinian, 1 INSTITUTES 1, § 51 (J. Thomas text & trans. 1985). 
 
[FN90]. The word "ius" has a number of meanings, however, in the context of 
f knowing the "ius"--the right of each person--was called "ars iuris": 
e art of law, or the art of what is just. J. HERVADA, NATURAL RIGHT AND 
N91]
jurisprudence it was understood as referring to the right of each person. The science, 
which consisted o
th
NATURAL LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 20 (1990). 
 
[F . It was not until mid-19th century that the common law was taught at Oxford 
N92]
and Cambridge. 
 
[F . F. ALEXANDER & S. SELESNICK, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY 
76 (1967). 
 
[FN93]. Galen and Hippocrates were first published in the orig
1
 
inal Greek in 1525 and 
526 respectively. Etziony, supra note 86, at 414. 
[FN94]. J. RAACH, A DIRECTORY OF ENGLISH COUNTRY PHYSICIANS 
1603-1643, at 8 (1962), quoted in Guy, Episcopal Licensing of Physicians, Surge
and Midwives, 56 BULL. HISTORY MED. 528, 532 (1982). 
 
ons, 
N95][F . "If one which is no physician or surgeon . . . will take a cure upon him, and 
S 
8). 
his patient dieth under his hand, this hath been holden to be a felonie." C. MERRET, 
A COLLECTION OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, CHARTERS, TRIALS AND 
LAW, AND JUDGES OPINIONS 66 (1660). See also IV E. COKE, INSTITUTE
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 251 (164
 
[FN96]. Henry VIII gr
P
September 1518. 1 G. CLARK, A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF 
PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 58 (1964). 
 
anted his letters patent under the Great Seal incorporating the 
resident and College or Commonalty of the faculty of Medicine of London on 23 
[FN97]. Id. at 56-60. 
 
[FN98]. The College could not compel provincial candidates to come to London for 
examination. Moreover, throughout the provinces of Canterbury and York, the licen
that confirmed the physicians' right to practice came from the local diocesan bishop. 
Guy, supra note 94, at 533. 
 
se 
[FN99]. Within its jurisdiction, the officers of
a
granted by the College. 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 5; 32 Hen. 8, c. 40; 1 Mariae, St. 2, c. 9. In
this respect, the College had the characteristics of a prerogative tribunal. 
 
 the College had the power to imprison 
nd keep at their pleasure those who practiced medicine badly or without a license 
 
N100][F . Guy, supra note 94, at 533. 
 
[FN101]. Polani, The Develop
in
TRADITION 57, 69 (G. Dunstan & M
 
ment of the Concepts and Practice of Patient Consent, 
 CONSENT IN MEDICINE CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN 
. Seller eds. 1983). 
[FN102]. R. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
PRIVATE LAW 12
 
7 (1988). 
[FN103]. MacKinney, supra note 85. 
 
[FN104]. Larkey, The Hippocratic Oath in Elizabethan England, 4 BULL. HIST
MED. 201 (1936). 
 
ORY 
[FN105]. W. SMITH, THE HIPPOCRATIC TRADITION (1979). 
 
[FN106]. Clark, Bernard Mandeville, M.D., and Eighteenth Century Ethics, in 
ote 69, at 270. LEGACIES, supra n
 
[FN107]. J. GREGO
O
 
RY, LECTURES ON THE DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS 
F A PHYSICIAN (printed for W. Strachan & T. Cadell 1772, reprinted in 1992). 
N108][F . Id. at 10. 
N109]
 
[F . Id. at 12. 
N110]
 
[F . Id. at 39. 
N111]
 
[F . Id. at 35. 
N112]
 
[F . Id. at 22-23. 
N113]
 
[F . Id. at 35. 
N114]
 
[F . Id. at 33. 
 
[FN115]. Larkey, supra note 104. 
 
[FN116]. 2 Wils. K.B. 359, 95 E.R. 850 (1767). 
 
[FN117]. For a discussion of this case, see R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A 
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORME
 
D CONSENT 116-17 (1986). 
[FN118]. In all early cases where the pre-existing relationship precluded an alleg
that forc
c
to indicate the alleged
 
ation 
e of arms had been used, the plaintiffs would use the writ of trespass sur le 
as (special action on the case) with a count of "ita negligenter" (an adverb designated 
 wrongful conduct). 
[FN119]. Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 2 Wils. K.B. 359, 360, 95 E.R. 860, 861 
(1767). 
 
[FN120]. Id. at 862. 
 
[FN121]. "[A]lthough
p
this particular case they have acted ignora
ru
 
 the defendants in general may be as skilful in their respective 
rofessions as any two gentlemen in England, yet the Court cannot help saying, that in 
ntly and unskilfully, contrary to the known 
le and usage of surgeons." Id. at 863. 
N122][F . Id. at 862. 
 
[FN123]. In re W, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 758. 
 
[FN124]. Id. at 765. 
 
[FN125]. T. PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS: OR A CODE OF INS
PRECEPTS, ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSIC
AND SURGEONS (1985). 
 
TITUTES AND 
IANS 
[FN126]. Percival's Medical Ethics became the foundation of the American Medica
Association's first Code of Medical Ethics. AM
A
NATIONAL MEDICAL CONVENTION (1846-1847). 
 
l 
ERICAN MEDICAL 
SSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
N127][F . Wing, Ethics and Psychiatric Research, in S. BLOCH & P. CHODOFF, 
PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 416 (2d ed. 1991). 
 
[FN128]. This article shall not discuss issues o
re
 
f consent that arise within such a 
lationship. 
N129][F . T. PERCIVAL, supra note 125, at 10-11 (emphasis in original). 
N130]
 
[F . Id. at 44-45 (emphasis in original). 
N131]
 
[F . Id. 
N132]
 
[F . Id. at 169. 
 
[FN133]. J. GREGORY, supra note 107, at 60-63. 
 
[FN134]. Id. at 63. 
 
[FN135]. 1 H. BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY WITH THE ADDITION OF 
MARGINAL REFERENCES AND NOTES BY JOHN FONBLANQUE (1793, 
reprinted 1979). 
 
[FN136]. The popularity of Grotius and Pufendorf in England may be gaug
fa
Between 1682
O
seven editions of the English translation, and one of the Barb
P
 
ed by the 
ct that six editions of the former's De Iure Belli were published there before 1750. 
 and 1758, at least nine editions of the Latin version of Pufendorf's De 
fficio Hominis et Civis Iuxta Legem Naturalem had appeared. There were also 
eyrac's French version. 
. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 3 (1980). 
[FN137]. Id. 
 
[FN138]. R. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 102, at 118-19. 
 
[FN139]. The principles of nature were the basis of th
c
BELLI AC PACIS prolegomena § 40 (1623), q
4
 
e law of nature; principles of 
ommon consent were the basis of the law of nations. H. GROTIUS, DE IURE 
uoted in P. STEIN, supra note 136, at 
. 
N140][F . 1 H. BALLOW, supra note 135, ch. 1, § 1. 
N141]
 
[F . P. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 148-49. 
N142]
 
[F . H. GROTIUS, supra note 139, lib. 2, ch. 11, § 5. 
N143]
 
[F . 1 H. BALLOW, supra note 135, ch. 2, § 1. 
 
[FN144]. Id. 
 
[FN145]. Id. § 1, n.(a). 
 
[FN146]. Chatterton v. Gerson, [1981] 1 Q.B. 432, 443; Sidaway v. Governors of 
ethlem Royal Hospital, [1985] A.C. 871 (Lord Scarman, dissenting); Marion's Case, 
man, 67 D.L.R.4th 321 (1990). 
B
175 C.L.R. 218 (1992); Malette v. Shul
 
[FN147]. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972). 
 
[FN148]. Id. at 780 (emphasis added). 
 
[FN149]. 1, 22 THE LETTERS OF THE YOUNGER PLINY 56 (B. Radice trans. 
1967). 
 
[FN150]. Id. 
 
[FN151]. "Nam impetu quodam et instinctu procurrere ad mortem commune cum 
multis, deliberare
c
Among the Sick in Classical Antiquity, 43 BULL. HISTORY M
 
 vero et causas eius expendere, utque suaserit ratio, vitae mortisque 
onsilium vel suscipere vel ponere ingentis est animi," See also Gourevitch, Suicide 
ED. 501, 514 (1969). 
[FN152]. For a discussion of historical definitions of consent, see P. YOUNG, supra
note 2, at 12-
 
 
14. 
[FN153]. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15 (emphasis added). 
 
[FN154]. Culver & Gert, The Inadequacy o
6
 
f Incompetence, 68 MILBANK Q. 619, 
21 (1990). 
N155][F . M. COWLING, MILL AND LIBERALISM 41 (2d ed. 1990). 
N156]
 
[F . J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
N157]
 
[F . Id. at 9. 
N158]
 
[F . Id. 
N159]
 
[F . Id. at 11. 
 
[FN160]. Id. at 12. 
 
[FN161]. Id. at 9. 
 
[FN162]. Und
m
 
er common-law rules, husbands alone had all the property of the 
arried parties. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 599, 131 E.R. 347, 362 (1861). 
N163][F . J. MILL, supra note 156, at 9. 
 
[FN164]. Id. 
 
[FN165]. Id. at 13. 
 
[FN166]. Id. 
 
[FN167]. In 1765, Lord Camden, C.J. declared: "Our law holds the property of every 
man so sacred that no man can set foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell State Tr. 1029 (1765), 95 E.R. 807,
E
 
." 
 [1558-1774] All 
.R. 41. 
N168][F . Rape was a punishable felony not so much because it violated the principle 
nterfered with the proprietary 
ght that a parent had in his daughter, and husband had in his wife. 
that "every man's person [is] sacred," but because it i
ri
 
[FN169]. J. MILL, supra note 156, at 9. 
 
[FN170]. M. COWLING, supra note 155, at 43-44. 
 
[FN171]. The hedonistic principle of the utilitarian philosophy goes back to the 
ns to a virtuous life by way of balancing pleasure in the sense of "ataraxia" (a 
reek word meaning serenity, tranquility, calmness of mind) against distress, 
Epicureans who advocated that their followers should decide how to achieve their 
aspiratio
G
discomfort, or pain. 
 
[FN172]. M. HÄYRY, LIBERAL UTILITARIANISM AND APPLIED ETHICS 3 
(1
 
994). 
N173][F . H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND: WILLING 29 (1978). Greek 
e state of the body rather than as a 
atum of consciousness or a state of mind--basic freedom was freedom of movement. 
]
philosophers understood freedom as an objectiv
d
 
[FN174 . ST. AUGUSTINE, DE LIBERO ARBITRIO, bk. III, v-viii. 
 
[FN175]. H. ARENDT, supra note 173, at 83. 
 
[FN176]. I. Kant, On Suicide, in
1
 
 LECTURES ON ETHICS 148 (L. Enfield trans. 
963). 
[FN177]. 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), aff'd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). 
 
[FN178]. Pratt, 79 N.E. at 563. 
 
[FN179]. Mrs. Davis' physical a
a
 
nd mental health deteriorated following the operations 
nd she was declared insane in 1889. 
N180][F . Pratt, 79 N.E. at 564. 
 
[FN181]. Pratt, 118 Ill. at 166. 
 
[FN182]. Pratt v. Davis, 37 Chic. Legal News 213, 213 (1905). 
N183]
 
[F . 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). The passage also was quoted with approval 
in Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913). Mohr v. Williams was overruled on
other grounds in 
 
 v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1957)Genzel . 
 
[FN184]. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 14-1
 
5. 
[FN185]. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Pratt, 79 N.E. at 562 also discussed the 
xception of necessity. 
N186]
e
 
[F . Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15. 
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